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INTRODUCTION 
These two evaluations were carried out by the Institute of 
Development Studies on behalf of the ODM as part of the ODM* s 
on-going programme of evaluation studies covering many facets of 
aid, capital aid as well as technical cooperation. 
The terms of reference (which were drawn up in consultation 
with the British Council) are below. It was originally intended 
to cover three countries but it has not yet been possible to do 
the study in India. This may follow later. It was intended to 
produce a commentary on the lessons to be learned from all three 
studies, but this cannot be prepared until the India study has 
been carried out. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
1. Studies of British Technical Cooperation in Botswana, India 
and Mauritius will be undertaken by the Institute of Development 
Studies at Sussex University. 
2. Each country study should assess British Technical Cooperation 
with each of these countries over the last seven years in terms of: 
i. The intermediate objectives of strengthening the base 
of indigenous skills and assisting the implementation of 
the general development programmes of the host government. 
ii. Any other objectives perceived to be important by the 
host government. In each case comment should also be 
made on the relevance of more recent and current 
activities to ODM»s present aid policy objectives. 
i 
3. In the light of the objectives referred to in paragraph 2, 
the study will assess for each sector the effectiveness of 
technical Cooperation, and suggest ways in which it could be more 
e c _ t i v e i n
 "the future. For instance is it possible or desirable 
for Technical Cooperation to be coodinated more closely with U K 
capital aid? 
4» In the case of Botswana, the study will concentrate on aid for 
education (excluding higher education) and rural development. 
L 
5 , A comprehensive study of the training programme financed 
by the United Kingdom will not be undertaken, but the team may 
be able to comment on broad issues, such as sectoral priorities, 
within the programme. In particular the team will assess past 
e x p e r i e n c e with third country training, and explore possibilities 
for the future. 
6. Examples of the issues that may be examined are: 
best ways of using technical cooperation personnel, e.g. 
experts, supplemented staff, or volunteers; 
political and social attitudes of UK personnel working 
overseas under the aid programme; 
participation of the recipient government in the selection 
of personnel, briefing etc.; 
the effect of terms and conditions of service on job 
performance; 
relationship of technical cooperation to policies of the 
recipient government; 
relationship to technical cooperation of other donors, 
including problems of coordination and comparative 
advantage in skills provision; 
extent of recipients participation in implementation; 
provision of local costs and support services. 
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c
1ir
fnary and Recommendations 
Botswana has achieved remarkably high rates of economic growth 
v e r
 the last decade. The main constraint upon growth shifted from 
° lack of finance to an acute shortage of technical and professional 
workers during the early 1970s. Accordingly, the technical co-
e r a t i o n component of aid increased markedly in importance. M o s t 
of this increase was provided by ODM, who help to finance 70 per 
cent of all expatriate contract officers working in Botswana under 
c o - o p e r a t i o n agreements of various kinds. In contrast, less than 
ten per cent of volunteer staff in Botswana are financedby British 
agencies. 
Much of British technical co-operation (UKTC) with Botswana 
does not directly support rural development. The main skill and 
occupational shortages are in technical and professional cadre 
positions related to modern sector development. Yet the Government's 
healthy financial position has been generated almost entirely by 
modern sector growth. Without it, the present opportunities and 
policies for rural development that are being promoted by the Govern-
ment would have remained out of reach. The UKTC programme has had 
an important role in helping to generate these financial surpluses. 
It is primarily in this indirect and long-term sense that UKTC has 
helped the poorer people. 
There seems no reason to seek a major change in the direction of 
ODM support within the near future. It is likely that its most useful 
role will continue to be in areas of u r b a n / m o d e m sector development -
thereby releasing the most effective Batswana for rural programmes. 
This judgement assumes that Botswana will continue to give high 
priority to rural development in her future policies. Should the 
emphasis change - or not develop in the ways promised by recent events 
- some shift of British policy may then be appropriate, towards a 
greater emphasis upon direct rural support. 
On the other hand, our enquiries have revealed that there are some 
important weaknesses in the UKTC programme with Botswana. In the 
main these comprise delays in recruitment, deficiencies in the 
motivation and attitudes of some of the British staff, problems 
experienced in training Batswana to replace expatriates, and diffi-
culties caused by existing contractual arrangements for some categories 
°f staff. Chi
r
 analysis has! led us to suggest a series of reforms which 
could improve the future effectiveness of OEM support. These conclusions 
and recommendations, grouped under five main heads, are summarized 
c.Loty. ^ indication is given of the paragraphs in the text where 
urther analysis and discussion may be found. 
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Paragraph 
Recrultinent 
a) Recruitment delays can be reduced, particularly 4.6 
for urgent vacancies, by the Botswana authorities 
giving a firmer indication of relative" priorities 
for outstanding indents. Ho indications of such 
priorities should be given to ODM by the British 
High Commission before these having been agreed 
with the Director of Personnel. Manpower Review 
Missions should aim to return to ODM with a batch 
of new indents, and with a clear idea of the 
relative priorities attached to outstanding 
vacancies. 
b) There is a need to pay much more attention to the 
process of finding the right man for the job. In 
particular the attitudes, motivation, social skills, 
family circumstances, and personal background of 
potential recruits should be focused upon more 
clearly than hitherto. In this regards 
1. A personnel officer should be seconded from the 
Directorate of Personnel to the Botswana High 
Commission in London, whose sole responsibility 
should be recruitment. 4.11 
2. A system of confidential reports should be 
instituted for all OSAS and other contract 
officers to facilitate retention of the best 
people for other overseas work. 4.13 
3. Interviews should take longer than at present, 
and should ascertain for example a man's family 
circumstances, whether he has teenage children, 
whether his wife would be happy not to have a 
job. Attempts should be made at this time to 
solicit the candidate's views about the kind of 
life he expects/wants to lead in Botswana, his 
view of an expatriate in Africa,etc. 4.15 
4. ODM should work out, in co-operation with re-
cipient governments, and after consultation with 
some of the women involved, ways in which wives 
of contract officers (and BHC staff) can be more 
effectively involved, and possibly employed, in 
local work. 4.16 
5. Job descriptions should convey clearly the 
specific duties and responsibilities of the 
post, its level of seniority, and the number 
and level of employees who will be responsible 
to the officer in question. 
Contractual Arrangements 
a) Existing contractual arrangements tend to 
attract people with inappropriate attitudes towards 
work, and to the host country. The emphasis in 
contracts is upon short-term gains, but with the 
risk of a significant long-term loss. In most 
occupations overseas work is not considered to be 
an advantage when seeking re-entry to the UK labour 
market, and the fact that no longer-term security 
is offered by the British Government is a disin-
centive for both the younger person who has to 
consider building up his career and the older man 
with family responsibilities. In this regard: 
1. ODM can expect to continue as a major source of 
TC personnel for the next ten to fifteen years. 
Efforts should be made to identify occupations and 
professions where there will be a continued long-
term need. Perhaps 25 per cent of overseas appoint-
ments in these jobs ought to be under contractual 
arrangements which guarantee a career structure 
for a 10 to 15 year period-conditional upon 
satisfactory performance. Whether this would 
most appropriately be on secondment, corps of 
specialists or home-based arrangements would be a 
matter for discussion. 
2. Particularly in the teaching profession attempts 
should be made to recognize overseas service as a -
positive factor when applying for re-appointment in 
UK. Teachers, particularly in the arts and social 
sciences, can gain much from overseas experience of 
immediate relevance to the quality of their teaching 
in this country. This may be as much a question of 
changing the attitudes of local education authorities 
as of giving teachers formal guarantees of re-
appointment. 
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Paragraphs 
b ) C o n t r a c t s for OSAS teachers should be changed, so 
that teachers are required both to take overseas 
leave during school vacations, and, in the case of 
contract renewals, to return at the beginning of 
the following term, accepting pay in lieu of leave 
where they are so eligible. 6.7/6.8 
(iii) Training 
The training responsibilities of contract 
officers are inadequately implemented. In this regard: 
a) All contracts, where appropriate, should mention 
the need to take initiative with training Batswana 
on the job. All TC personnel should be told that 
they are expected to make strenuous efforts to 
identify, encourage and train someone to replace them. 4.20 
b) Training responsibilities should be addressed during 
the orientation course recommended under V b) to v d) 
below. 
c) The counterpart system needs to be nade more 
effective. Inter alia we believe it would help if 
all TC officers with counterparts set apart one 
hour each week to discuss the work done since the 
previous meeting, and problems that have arisen. 
7.1 
4.19 
(iv) Range and Emphasis of Assistance 
For as long as the Botswana Government is 
energetically pursuing its policy of social justice, 
including attempts to improve the lot of the poorer 4.9 
rural people, the British Government should continue 5.2 
to support the full range of TC needs as perceived 
and requested by the Botswana Government. 
At the same time: 
a) This should not exclude possible specialisation 
depending upon Botswana's needs and the relative 4.9 
capabilities of the UK and other donors. 5.3 
b) Urban bias should be carefully.monitored. In 
particular, the UK should examine the urban-
rural locations of its TC staff and be ready to 
increase the rural proportion, especially through 5.8 
volunteers and younger people, if requested. , 5
t
12 
c
) In education, support for English-medium primary 
schools should be phased out over the next few years. 
Support for secondary education and teacher training 
should continue. 
d) IVS should reverse its decision not to support the 
secondary school system. 
Training and Orientation for UKTC Personnel 
UKTC should be made more effective through the 
carefully planned and managed training and orientation 
of UKTC personnel. 
In particular: 
a) UKTC personnel should receive professional 
management training. 
b) UKTC personnel and their spouses should have a one 
or two-week orientation course soon after arriving 
in Botswana. 
c) The course might be organised by extending an 
initiative already being undertaken for volunteer 
training by IVS. 
d) Some 8 courses a year might be run, each involving 
about 12 UKTC personnel and their spouses. 
e) In addition and on a voluntary basis, those UKTC 
personnel with direct responsibilities for rural 
policies and programmes should be permitted and 
encouraged to spend between one and three weeks 
living in a village as part of their orientation. 
Two broadly different objectives of evaluation can 
be distinguished. The first may be referredlito as a 
"summative" objective, where the aim is to assess the worth 
or overall contribution, according to agreed criteria, of 
what has been achieved. A "formative" objective, on the other 
hand, emphasizes the identification and diagnosis of current 
problems and opportunities, with a view to improving 
performance and benefits in the future. In this study of UK 
Technical Cooperation (UKTC) with Botswana we have primarily 
adopted the second objective, since this appears more feasible 
and more useful, both for UKTC and for Botswana. 
We have interviewed over the space of a few weeks, about 
sixty officers of the Botswana Government, both expatriate and 
local, and personnel from some of the diplomatic missions and 
voluntary agencies. Our approach in each case was not to 
prepare a sample, or to ask a list of identical previously 
prepared questions. Rather, we tended to begin with general, 
open-ended discussion, and to pursue the major problems and 
themes that emerged and that appeared important to the inter-
viewees and ourselves. In some cases, this led to in-depth 
sessions of two or three hours, and in others to interviews 
of only a few minutes. Whilst we recognise that this has 
placed more responsibility upon our own judgement and integrity 
than a more rigid approach would have done, the flexibility of 
the method has generated rather more insights than we feel we 
would otherwise have gained. 
Any evaluation of UKTC which is looking towards the future 
has nonetheless to be set against the history and conditions of 
the country concerned. This is especially important in the case 
of Botswana because of the dramatic changes which have taken 
place during the ten years since Independence. We start there-
fore with a review of the economic development of Botswana 
during recent years, and the changing structure of British aid. 
We then consider general issues before focusing on two key 
sectors - rural development, and education. 
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Economic Background and the Changing Structure of 
BritishjVid 
^ At the time of Botswana's Independence in 1966 it seemed 
that promoting economic development in the country would be a 
slow and difficult task. Until that date, the territory had 
been administered from Mafeking in the Republic of South Africa, 
which served as the country's capital. There was an almost 
complete lack of basic infrastructure outside the two small 
towns of Lobatse and Francistown, and the country was in the 
midst of the worst drought in living memory with one fifth 
of the population of almost 600,000 receiving famine relief. In 
1966 revenue from internal sources amounted to less than P6 
million,^
 a n (
j th
e
 Government received a grant-in-aid from 
Britain to finance 60 per cent of its recurrent expenditure 
in that year. The Government's development expenditure of 
P5 million was entirely financed from overseas aid. Though it 
was known at that time that Botswana possessed potentially rich 
mineral deposits of copper-nickel, communications in this vast 
country were extremely difficult, and it seemed that the invest-
ment needed to develop the mineral sector would not be available 
for many years to come. 
3.2 A British Economic Survey Mission which visited the 
territory on the eve of Independence to assess development 
prospects considered that mineral exploitation could have 
effects upon Government revenue only in the long-term. The 
problem thus appeared to be how to achieve development from 
other eources, in a way which did not significantly boost the 
budget deficit in the short-term, but which would eventually 
reduce the country's dependence upon grants-in-aid. The 
alternatives were limited. It seemed that agriculture, and 
in particular cattle-ranching, would necessarily remain the 
basis of the economy Even with stringent economic and 
financial management by the Government it seemed at that time 
that the recurrent budget deficit, and hence the need for 
recurrent support from UK, would remain throughout the following 
decade. 
v
er the period since Independence, the exchange rate between 
® erling and the South African Rand has varied within the range 
*
 R 1
» 5 - R2.2. ' P' is an abbreviation for Pula, Botswana's 
a
 ional currency which was introduced in 1976, and which is at 
the
S
R
n t t l e d t 0 t h e U S d o l l a r a t t h e s a m e
 international value as 
e
 Rand. For the sake of simplicity Pula are used as the 
^rency unit throughout this case study. 
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This early pessimism has been proved unfounded@ Though 
a d m i t t e d l y from a very low income base, extremely high rates 
of economic growth have been sustained in Botswana since the 
late 1960's. Since the structure of growth has itself had a 
m a j o r influence upon aid flows, both in financial and manpower 
t e r m s , it is useful to summarise the main ways in which these 
e c o n o m i c changes were achieved. 
First in 1969 the terms of the Southern African Customs 
Union Agreement were re-negotiated. Prior to Independence 
the existing formula, which had been agreed to in 1910, had 
g e n e r a t e d for Botswana about PI.2 million per annum. The 
immediate effect of the re-negotiation was roughly to triple 
the revenues accruing to Government from this source. But 
the medium term effects, when the imports resulting from 
large investments of foreign capital in Botswana began to 
accelerate, were much more substantial. By 1973/74 customs 
receipts reached P21 million. 
3.5 Second, a very high priority was placed by the new 
Government upon the provision of physical infrastructure. A 
new capital, Gaborone, was completed shortly after Independence, 
and the construction of a copper-nickel mine and township 
at Selebi-Pikwe was started soon afterwards. As a result, 
between 1960 and 1970 approximately 55 per cent of Government's 
development expenditure was devoted to the provision of 
physical infrastructure, with, in some years, the proportion 
reaching 70 per cent. About 60 per cent of this expenditure 
took place in urban areas. In addition, a diamond mine and 
associated township was built at Orapa, almost entirely by 
private foreign capital. It is estimated that these mining 
and urban developments at Selebi-Pikwe and Orapa involved a 
total investment equivalent to over twice the country's GDP 
in 1970. 
3*6 Third the viability of the mining prospects above, together 
with the facts that Botswana was still one of the poorest 
countries in the world, and very vulnerable to its powerful 
and potentially hostile neighbours, significantly increased the 
flow of aid funds for supportive social and physical investment. 
Thus external development finance increased from P4.5 million 
in 1967 /8 to P23.2 million in 1972/3. Botswana received more 
financial aid per capita over that period than any other 
independent country for which data are available. 
These circumstances, together with, more recently, 
increasingly favourable international prices for beef exports, 
generated rates of economic growth in excess of 20 per cent 
per annum over the period 1967/8 to 1973/4 and domestic 
income per capita is now estimated to be almost five times 
greater than its pre-Independence level. 
A major target of the growth strategy has been that of 
maximizing Government's domestic revenues. In the early 
years.this was needed to release the country from its 
dependence upon recurrent support from UK. After this had 
been achieved in 1972/3, the goal of revenue maximisation was 
retained in the short-term, since it was seen as the means 
to secure substantial resources for re-investment in the rural 
areas. Nevertheless, associated with this strategy, certain 
tensions and problems have arisen that had not been foreseen. 
For example, there has been a significant growth of urban 
poverty, and a worsening of income inequalities both between 
and within rural and urban areas. Though significant 
financial surpluses have now been generated, the attempt to 
direct a major proportion of investment to the rural areas 
is of very recent origin. And those programmes that have 
been mounted have probably not yet affected the welfare of 
the very poorest people significantly. Most important for the 
purposes of the present study is the fact that there has been 
a big increase in the number of non-citizens employed in 
Botswana - from about 2,500 to 4,500 persons over the last 
ten years. The localisation problem is now more difficult to 
solve than it was at Independence: though expatriates are now 
a slightly smaller proportion of the formal sector labour 
force, both their absolute numbers and their average level of 
skill have increased and on balance, the training and 
experience required by Batswana to replace them involves both 
a stronger and lopger preparation. 
By any standards Botswana's economic growth over this 
period is remarkable^ and a rapid increase in demand for 
skilled workers was inevitably associated with it. Though 
the demand for technical skills has been strongly influenced 
by the highly capital intensive investments that have been 
taking place, this increased dependence upon expatriate workers 
was particularly marked as a result of the paucity of education 
and training facilities in the country until the mid - 1960's. 
At Independence only 1,500 children were enrolled in secondary 
schools, with pitifully small numbers at the higher levels of 
the system. In 1964, for example, 39 students were involved 
in fifth-form studies, of whom 27 passed the Cambridge Overseas 
School Certificate examinations, 13 doing well enough to qualify 
for entrance to the local university. Yet at that time, only 
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24 of the 184 administrative and professional posts in the 
public Service were held by Batswana; even at lower levels, 
only 275 out of 613 technical, executive and clerical posts 
were held by local officers. Thus, staffing requirements of 
the Public Service alone implied that the capacity of the 
s e c o n d a r y school system was completely inadequate to service 
the needs of the newly independent Botswana. Even with the 
strong emphasis the Government has given to the expansion and 
i m p r o v e m e n t of education and training facilities over the past 
d e c a d e , these small beginnings inevitably implied a big increase 
in expatriate recruitment in the short to medium term. 
Thus the major constraint on Botswana's development 
shifted in the late 1960's from a shortage of finance to, 
increasingly, a shortage of skilled manpower. The increasing 
demands of implementing an ambitious development programme 
generated rapid increases in the Government establishment of 
about 13 per cent per year between 1969 and 1972 and about 
11 per cent thereafter. A high priority was placed upon the 
localisation of the Public Service, and the fact that Govern-
ment was able to have first choice from the students emerging 
from all levels of the education system allowed the number of 
non-citizens employed in established posts of the Central 
Government to decrease from 684 to 669 between 1969 and 1972 
in spite of rapid establishment increases. But after the latter 
date competition for skilled Batswana from other sectors of 
the economy, together with a need to reduce the intolerably 
high level of vacancies in the Public Service, led to some 
increase in the number of expatriates working in government. 
These trends are illustrated by Table I which shows the 
shift in the structure of UK aid to Botswana between 1969 and 
1975. During the three years 1970, 1971 and 1972, financial 
aid was about 80 percent of total aid flows from the UK. How-
ever, technical cooperation then became more important, markedly 
so from 1972 to 1975, during which time it rose from about 20 
per cent to about 40 per cent of the total disbursement. This 
resulted from an increase from 255 to 415 OSAS and other supple-
mented personnel working in Botswana, a jump of 60 per cent 
over the same three year period.* 
Data are for December of each year. Source: British Aid 
Statistics. 
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The number of expatriates financed by other donors also 
increased over these years - particularly those from North 
American volunteer organisations, and personnel from the 
Scandinavian countries. Though time-series data are not 
available Tables 2a - 2c show the position that had emerged 
by mid - 1975. The relative importance of the British 
programme in Botswana is immediately apparent. At that time 
fully 70 per cent of all TC personnel were wholly or partly 
financed by UK (Table 2a). Though only about 10 per cent 
of the volunteers were British (Table 2b), half of all the 
fully or partly funded personnel in Botswana at that time 
were from UK (Table 2c). Though accurate data are not 
available, these ratios have not significantly changed over 
the last eighteen months. Thus the quality of the British 
personnel working in Botswana is of critical importance to 
the implementation of the country's development programme, 
and British technical cooperation is liable to have profound 
economic and social effects upon the society. 
L . 
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^ t r a c t Officers and Volunteers working in Botswana 
31 May 1975, by Nationality. 
Contract 
Officers Volunteers Total. Percentage. 
a. 
390 
26 
18 
46 
10 
28 
23 
18 
21 
125 
65 
26 
60 
418 
49 
36 
67 
135 
65 
60 
26 
49 
6 
4 
8 
16 
8 
7 
3 
Total 550 306 856 100 
a. Items do not add to total owing to rounding 
b. Nationality unknown. 
Tables 2a and 2b. 
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r
hnical Cooperation: System and Problems 
How the System Works 
The recruitment of TC personnel from UK is re-
n e g o t i a t e d on a two-yearly basis. This Manpower Review 
g
x e i
cise establishes an overall ceiling for recruitment 
0
f OSAS and seconded officers, and establishes approximate 
ceilings for staff to work in each of the sectoral 
m i n i s t r i e s . At present, following the review exercise 
which took place in November 1976, the ceiling stands at 
about 550 posts, which remains unchanged from its previous 
level of the last two years. In fact however the number of-
staff in post are always significantly less than the ne-
gotiated ceiling: the number of outstanding indents as a 
p r o p o r t i o n of the total approved recruitment posts has been 
running at 15 to 20 per cent for some years. 
From the Botswana Government side the preparation for 
the review negotiations involves compiling lists of all UK 
staff in post, classified by name, department, post, 
termination date, and estimated date of localisation. In 
addition, Ministries are required to detail their present 
establishment, showing UK and other TC personnel, local 
staff, and present vacancies, together with their expected 
training needs over the next three years. The Directorate 
of Personnel, in consultation with Department Heads, 
estimates growth requirements over the next three or four 
years together with the expected or desired levels of 
recruitment from other agencies, and thereby derives the 
likely TC needs under the British programme. 
These needs are used as a basis for discussion with the 
ODM Manpower Review Team, who meet with the Directorate of 
Personnel, the British High Commissioner, and officers in 
each of the Ministries over a two week period. The ODM 
team formulate their own views of relative priorities on the 
basis of these discussiins, and the overall and sectoral 
ceilings are agreed between the Botswana Government and ODM 
before the return of the team to UK. This framework then 
becomes the basis for the future cooperation programme. 
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The word "negotiation" is rather too strong to describe 
this process, at least on the basis or recent experience. 
During the latest review there was very little conflict between 
the priorities as seen by both parties, and since Botswana 
r e q u e s t e d no increase in the existing ceiling, agreement proved 
to be easy and straightforward. In general OEM is very 
responsive to Botswana's needs, and both respects and 
generally aocepts the priorities as seen by the Botswana 
Government. Negotiations have in the past been much tougher -
though almost always in cases where some increase in the 
recruitment ceiling was requested. For example an increase of 
almost 30 per cent requested in 1972 required lengthy and 
detailed justification by the Botswana authorities before 
being agreed by ODM. 
In the context of the above framework the process of 
recruitment is as follows. Following the annual estimates pro-
cedure whereby new posts are created in the establishment, a 
major recruitment drive occurs in mid-year from university 
leavers (both from Botswana and from Universities abroad) and 
at Christmas from the schools. For posts that cannot be filled 
from these or other local sources, or for posts that become 
vacant during the year for which no local candidates are available, 
the Directorate of Personnel decides whether or not to start 
recruitment from overseas. This is not usually undertaken for 
posts more junior than those in the middle of the technical cadre. 
If the request is sent to the UK for recruitment under OSAS 
terms an "indent", copied to the British High Commission, is sent 
to ODM, which gives a detailed job description together with 
details of local salary, location, department etc., attached to 
the post in question. ODM then instructs Crown Agents (usually) 
to advertise the post.l -j^e latter draw up a short list and 
conduct interviews, sending details of the short-listed candidates 
together with the ir CVs and occupational history to the Directorate 
of Personnel. Crown Agents usually indicate who would be their 
preferred candLctete. This material is sent by the Directorate 
to the Head of/lfepartment in which the post falls, who in turn 
subsequently advises the Directorate as to which candidate if any 
should be appointed. The decision is then sent back to ODM who in 
turn instruct Crown Agents to appoint the person concerned on 
behalf of the Botswana Government. 
procedure for posts that are to be filled by British SCAAP or 
seconded officers is slightly different. Here the request is sent 
the High Commission who then forward it, with comments, to ODM, who 
l n
 turn undertake recruitment. 
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i L
 problems 
D t
 w c in Recruitment 
The average length of time that elapses between sending an 
indent from Botswana to appointment of a recruit is nine months, 
though o f t e n in cases of senior technical posts t h e delay is 
longer than this. Delays at the British end sometimes occur 
when no indication of the priority of different posts is given 
by B o t s w a n a . On the other hand, the comments sent by the High 
Commission can also be misleading. In the case of a recent 
vacancy with very high priority for the implementation of the 
G o v e r n m e n t ' s Incomes Policy it appears that the British High 
C o m m i s s i o n in Gaborone believed recruitment not to b e urgent. 
Five months after the indent for this post was sent to London, 
the post was not even listed in the ODM News Sheet showing 
the current status of recruitment for Botswana vacancies. 
London did not respond until a personal request from a Botswana 
Cabinet Minister to the British High Commissioner two months 
later succeeded in putting some urgency behind the original 
request. It now appears that it will be a full twelve months 
before this officer is in post. Too much must not be made of 
one example, but misunderstandings between the Directorate 
of Personnel and the High Commission should be relatively easy to 
avoid. Careful liaison between these agencies on the relative 
priorities of outstanding indents should occur in future, before 
the High Commission's comments are sent to ODM. An additional 
opportunity for speeding up the recruitment process is given by 
the Manpower Review exercise itself. During the review, progress 
with recruitment for outstanding vacancies should be examined. 
The Mission should also seek to identify new vacancies that will 
arise over the ensuing 6 to 12 months. The aim should be for 
members of the Review Team to return to London with a batch of 
new indents, and with clear instructions as to the relative 
priority of indents to which recruitment has not yet been success-
ful. 
B
 Mgje Aid to the Poorest 
Tables 3 and 4 give some indication of the changing sectoral 
composition of UK Technical Cooperation with Botswana over the 
past few years. Table 3 gives a rather aggregate picture owing 
to changes in sectoral groupings in the source document. How-
l e r , it can be seen that though the proportion of TC personnel 
going to education increased between 1969 and 1975, the proportion 
going to health, agriculture and lands fell over the period. 
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Data on a ministerial basis are given in Table 4, for 
the period 1974-1976. A similar trend is revealed in that 
p e r s o n n e l in education have increased faster than the total 
f
0
r all ministries, whilst those in agriculture and local 
government have increased at a slightly slower rate. The 
main recipients of UKTC personnel are the Ministries of 
Works, Agriculture, Education and Finance, in that order, 
whilst the main increase over the last three years has been in 
the Ministry of Works and Communications. Though the data are 
interesting in their own right they do not in themselves reveal 
whether the UK programme is directly aiding the cause of rural 
development. Indeed, though it may be surprising, the Ministry 
of Works and Communications has had a major role in rural 
construction under the Accelerated Rural Development Programme, 
and British aid to this sector may well have been more directly 
instrumental in improving rural services over the past few years 
than has its provision of medical doctors and secondary school 
teachers. For sound judgements of this kind to be made one needs 
not merely information upon sectoral allocations nor even upon 
job titles, but rather upon the ways in which individual officers 
spend their time in the office, and the specific tasks they do. 
In one sense it is arguable that the question whether the 
UKTC programme furthers the aims of 'aid to the poorest', or 
of rural development is misleading. This is particularly so in 
the case of a country which espouses these aims as a major 
focus of domestic policy, and where serious efforts are being 
made to achieve them. It would be wrong to assume that other 
skills can be ignored. The fact is that in requests made to 
UK by Botswana no special priority is given to rural development-
related posts, precisely because the needs cover all sectors and a 
the higher levels of skill. Botswana does not particularly 
select out the UK to provide aid to the rural sector - indeed 
there are good reasons why she should not do so. One reason 
is given by the specialist nature of other recruitment agencies. 
Such specialism occurs either because the agencies themselves 
exercise preference,as with the highly selective approach of 
the Ford Foundation or of USAID, or because they are not in a 
position to supply the full range of skills that Botswana still 
requires. Much of the strength and value of the (SIM approach 
is that it does not exercise undue leverage, that it is prepared 
to pick up unglamorous posts, and that it is prepared to assist 
°n a wide front. As in other countries there are dangers of 
urban bias. But at this stage in Botswana the efficient working-
°f the small urban sector is a necessary condition for rural 
development. The creation and operation of a basic structure 
of services in towns and large villages make it easier to extend 
services to remoter rural areas. For as long as the Botswana 
0 
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r ^ T T - OSAS Staff in 
TABLE 
Post, by Min: Lstry, 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 6 
—' 1974 1975 1976 Percentage 
Increase since 1974 
1 
of
fice of the President 19 22 20 + 5 
Finance and Planning 39 38 50 + 28 
( including A u d i t ) 
Health 1 0 . 14 18 + 8 0 
Labour and Home Affairs 4 2 4 — 
Agriculture 51 65 70 + 37 
Education 50 62 76 + 52 
Commerce and Industry 25 18 13 - 48 
Mineral Resources and 21 27 27 + 29 
Water 
Local Government and 25 25 33 + 32 
Lands 
Vorks and Communications 47 79 92 + 96 
Justice 7 8 12 + 71 
Total OSAS 298 360 415 + 39 
• Secondments, SCAAP 27 27 19 - 30 
Corps of Specialists 3 3 4 * '2-5 
GRAND TOTAL 328 390 438 m 
Notes: 1. Data are for June of each year shown 
and are thus not comparable with 
Table 3. 
Source: ODM, Manpower Planning Unit. 
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G o v e r n m e n t is resolute in its attempt to reach and help the poorer 
people in the rural areas it will not be inconsistent with the 
policy of "aid for the poorest" to meet a wide range of basic 
t e c h n i c a l cooperation needs even where these are urban in 
o r i e n t a t i o n , while at the same time endeavouring to contribute 
more directly to the poor in the rural sector. 
SkiUs 
q The facts that ODM supplies such a large proportion of 
the contract officers working in Botswana, and that these 
officers include people with middle-level as well as high-
level skills and talents, do, however, bring special problems. 
The first of these, and perhaps the least intractable, concerns
; 
their professional skills. There is a feeling throughout the 
Botswana Government that, by and large, the OSAS programme 
provides people who perform their jobs with competence. There 
are, of course, some - occasionally serious-exceptions, where 
incompetence has resulted in the early termination of contracts. 
Such cases are probably inevitable in a programme which comprises 
more than 400 persons. On the other hand mediocrity,either in 
terms of proficiency or motivation ,is much more common and this 
is a significant area of concern. 
11 Again, the ways in which this can be tackled include 
action by both donor and recipient, but mainly concern methods 
of recruitment. On the Botswana side, there is a tendency to 
allow the job descriptions for TC posts to be written in a 
routine fashion. The specific duties and responsibilities of the 
post are not always entirely clear, which creates problems both 
for the advertising and selection agencies. It may not always 
be clear how senior the post is, n o r whether it calls for 
managerial as well as technical responsibility. A second 
constraint is that the interviewing panel may often not have 
the benefit of a person or persons who have worked in Botswana 
or who know the difficulties and responsibilities of the job 
in question. Ideally a relatively senior Motswana, experienced 
in personnel matters, from the Botswana High Commission in London 
ought to be present at most interviews. Though attempts are made 
to achieve this the staff situation at the High Commission often 
does not allow it. Secondment of a person from the Directorate 
of Personnel to London whose sole concern was recruitment matters 
in UK would do much to strengthen the existing situation. This 
could do much to improve the effectiveness of the recruitment 
process, and the costs involved for Botswana would be easily 
justified. 
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The most important failure of the present system with 
1 2
 r
egard to w o r k proficiency, however, concerns the information 
that is made available to the Botswana Government on alternative 
c a n d i d a t e s for a given post. Though curricula vitae are available, 
together with some impression of how well candidates performed 
under interview, only in very rare cases is there any indication 
of how such people have performed in earlier jobs in their 
c a r e e r . In Botswana, as in other countries, no confidential 
a s s e s s m e n t s of performance are requested from t h e Ministries 
in which returning OSAS officers have worked, except in the 
rare cases where such an officer signs uf> with the Resettlement 
Bureau in London. Similarly, no requirement exists for the 
officers themselves to submit progress or terminal reports, as is 
the case with Seconded or SCAAP officers. Consequently the only 
indication of failure in overseas assignments are cases of gross 
negligence, corruption or other such offences which justify 
early termination of contract. There is no real mechanism, at 
present, whereby mediocrity can be identified and remedied. 
4,13 The introduction of a system of confidential reports is, 
however, fraught with difficulties. This is particularly the 
case when an employer knows that he is not ./likely to see the 
person again, let alone employ him. In overseas assignments 
this is compounded by the fact that one has no independent 
evidence of the integrity and reliability of the person who submits 
the report. Nevertheless we believe that some attempt to assess 
the performance of OSAS officers is essential if the efficiency 
and standards of service are to be improved. There are various 
possibilities. One would be to institute a system similar to 
that which, we believe operates in the diplomatic service, whereby 
one adverse report on performance would be viewed far less 
seriously than two or three. The benefits of this , or a similar 
system are potentially very considerable. It would allow, on the 
one hand, a more aggressive approach to recruitment by the ODM/ 
Crown Agents, and on the other a much clearer means of deciding 
which people should be considered for what types of appointment 
overseas. 
D
 Attitudes 
The most serious criticism of British Technical Cooperation 
personnel in Botswana, which we have encountered time and again 
in our interviews, is that they are sadly lacking in terms of 
commitment, motivation and social skills. Moreover these def-
iciencies are more widespread amongst the British than amongst 
personnel financed by other agencies. The older British Officers 
have often served in other African countries over many years. 
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Some - though they seem to be a minority - have benefitted 
greatly from this experience and put it to good use. Many 
others feel they have encountered all the problems before, 
and have minds closed to tackling the job in new ways. Many 
of these persons are paternalistic, enjoy a "colonial"type 
of existence, make little or no attempt ;,to mix with Batswana 
outside the office, and are often still in Africa only because 
they could not preserve their present standard of living if 
they were to return to the UK. Batswana find even many of the 
younger officers unattractive as a body of people. It is felt 
that their motivation is mainly financial - wanting to save 
money for the mortgage, or have their children educated 
privately, or enjoy some travel, sun and game parks before 
embarking more seriously on a career after returning home. 
Many of these attitudes are understandable. We recognise also 
that there have been, and are a good number of able and dedicated 
British officers in Botswana who are not like this. What is 
important is not merely that the above attitudes exist,,but 
rather the extent to which they exist, and the number of people 
who are primarily motivated in the above ways rather from a 
sense of altruism, service or commitment. 
Commitment is not too much to ask. We strongly believe 
that serious attempts must be made to improve the calibre and 
commitment of the British personnel in Botswana and, moreover, 
that this can be done. The first point again concerns recruit-
ment. The fact that Britain has been a colonial power itself 
means that much more attention ought to be given to sorting out 
people with undesirable social attitudes than is the case, say, 
with the Swedes and the Danes. A man who has given 'long 
service in hard stations' may have much good and relevant 
experience which will be useful in Botswana. Equally, however, 
his social and political attitudes may be highly undesirable. 
Much more attention needs to be paid to this dimension during 
interviews. This includes not only attitudes, but also the 
personalities of candidates. We believe that to work closely 
with people of an entirely different social, cultural and 
economic background requires maturity and emotional stability. 
There are also particular difficulties of living in Botswana 
which place greater social strains on the individual than is 
the case in the UK: wives increasingly cannot find jobs and 
become bored; children in their late teenage years who are not 
in school can easily become a problem; privacy is more difficult 
to achieve, and personal, emotional or family difficulties are 
more difficult to conceal. All these circumstances imply that 
the attitudes and personality of a candidate are important and 
relevant to the question of whether he is suitable for a particular 
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b . Other donor agencies recognise this. SIDA, for example, 
i n t e r v i e w s the whole family of job applicants who have been 
short-listed. The interviews last over a period of three days, 
during which time a man and wife are closely examined for 
e v i d e n c e of their social and political attitudes and are 
given psychological tests. The Swedes also consider it important 
to select couples whose relationships are stable, since they 
believe that problems and disagreements are likely to be exacer-
bated by the additional strains of living abroad. As far as we 
can ascertain UK recruitment agencies have not so far paid close 
enough attention to these factors. This may well be a major 
reason why UKTC personnel are felt to be deficient in these 
r e s p e c t s . 
lb In addition, more efforts need to be made by ODM to pursue ways 
in which the wives of contract officers (and of BHC staff) may 
be employed during their domicile abroad. Opportunities for 
voluntary work should be explored with recipient governments, 
and with the women concerned. Furthermore, the opportunity 
of sending husband and wife teams, with both of them on UKTC 
terms should be sought, rather than discouraged, as at present. 
17 Closely associated with the problems of attitudes and motivation 
of contract officers is the question of security and the lack 
of career prospects for UKTC personnel after their return to 
the UK. The lack of security which OSAS officers have beyond 
their current contract has bad effects: it gives them a dis-
incentive to train counterparts who might replace them; it 
makes OSAS contracts overseas unattractive to really able people 
from the UK who are in mid-career; and it discourages the best 
younger people in development work from continuing, since they 
cannot be assured of career. There is, then, a bias in the 
present contract system which tends to encourage and select 
precisely the type of person who ought not to be recruited. 
Statistics to justify this judgement are not easily available. 
But it is worth noting that of the young expatriate economist/ 
planning officers who have worked in Botswana over the past five or 
six years, and who have now left Botswana, about half are now no 
longer working in jobs related to development. This is particularly 
serious since the young expatriates in this cadre have had a very 
high reputation in the country. They have had almost uniformly 
high standards of professional competence and have been notable 
for their integrity and for their commitment and dedication both 
to their jobs and to the aims and ideals of Botswana. It is 
precisely these kinds of people who should be encouraged to stay 
in overseas service, both to maintain a cadre of real expertise 
the Third World within the UK and because the UK is likely to 
remain an important source of technical cooperation personnel 
for at least another 10 years. 
- 26 -
^jryaininz of Batswana 
The final problem is the role of TC officers in training. 
Our interviews with senior Batswana in Government revealed the 
view that TC ought to serve a dual role. The primary one is 
that of a 'stop gap', supplying skills which local officers have 
not yet had chance to acquire. The second, which is seen as, 
being almost as important, is that of helping Batswana to 
a c q u i r e t h o s e skills. T h i s second objective, by common consensus, 
is only very poorly achieved. 
One reason is that training is seldom institutionalised 
except at senior levels. In cases where counterparts are 
identified, the relationship is uneasy since neither party is 
entirely sure of his role. The success of the system largely 
depends upon the personalities of the two people involved. 
In the few cases where we did identify and interview Batswana 
who have gone through the counterpart system, their comments 
were usually negative. Often the expatriate officer had been 
too heavily pressed in terms of his own work-load to spend much 
time explaining the 'whys' and 'wherefores' of how the job was 
best done. With senior UKTC personnel the problem appears often 
to be not their attitudes to training, but rather their not 
really knowing how to set about it. It seems that the only way 
to improve these arrangements is to educate both expatriate and 
counterpart in the ways of getting the best out of their 
relationship. It may be that setting aside one hour each week 
to talk about the problems that have cropped up would be useful. 
The arrangements would need to vary according to the persons and 
the jobs concerned. 
IH less senior occupations, many OSAS officers tend to 
interpret their job description to the letter. If training is 
not mentioned as part of their responsibilities they resist 
becoming involved. This problem is exacerbated in some of the 
executive ministries, where trainers are designated as such, 
and are usually on a higher salary than their technical colleagues. 
Thus TC personnel often refuse to undertake training unless they 
are re-designated and paid more. The other major problem in this 
area is quite simply that many OSAS officers see it as against 
their own interests to train, since they would be "working themselves 
out of a job'. Ways of overcoming these problems are suggested in 
the final section of this report. Meanwhile, however, we shall 
dis cuss some of the more important problems that have emerged from 
our sectoral studies of technical cooperation with Botswana in the 
fields of education and of rural development. 
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•jH_sh Technical Cooperation and Rural Development 
In his introduction to the draft National Development Plan 
1976-81 the Vice President stressed that "The Government 
c o n t i n u e s to attach the highest priority to the policy of 
rural development". In many places the Plan emphasises the 
n a t i o n a l goal of social justice. This can be set beside the 
facts that the great majority of Batswana (6 out of 7) live 
in rural areas and that it is in the rural areas, especially 
those that are more remote, that most of the poorest people 
live. The strategy remains as it was in the previous plan to 
invest government revenue, much of it from the mining sector, 
in the rural areas both to decrease urban-rural inequalities 
and to benefit the poorer rural people. 
In view of these national objectives and also of the 
British policy of more aid to the poorest, it is at first 
sight strange to note that almost three-quarters of British 
technical co-operation is not directly connected with rural 
development. Two points can be made here. First, by filling 
vital gaps which are not rurally-oriented, this TC is helping to 
maintain conditions in which rural development can take place. 
Without it basic services might not work, or local manpower 
might be diverted away from rural development in order to fill 
urban gaps. Second, there is no clear border-line between TC 
which is rurally-oriented and that which is not. Posts and 
Telecommunications and the Central Transport Organisation, with 
21 and 29 TC officers in post respectively, are examples of 
organisations which might appear urban-oriented but the efficient 
functioning of which is a precondition for much rural development. 
In those organisations which are more directly involved in 
rural development (see table 5), there were in September/ 
October 1976 some 136 staff in post, not including about 29 IVS 
volunteers, more than half of whom were doing rural work. The 
contribution of British TC is particularly marked in Agriculture 
including the Veterinary Department, and in Surveys and Lands, 
which between them account for 82 out of the 136. 
There has been some international specialisation of technical 
assistance for rural development. Sweden has concentrated on TC 
— fot rtlral water development which it is also financing, and 
Norway has concentrated on TC for health which, again, it is 
helping to finance. The UK continues to provide support to the 
whole range of key departments and ministries, with a tendency 
s
ee Tables 4 and 5. 
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which may be increasing to specialise in the Ministry of 
Agriculture (28 in post), the Veterinary Department (26 in 
post), Surveys and Lands(18 in post) and, although this is 
perhaps further from rural development, Geological Survey 
(18 in post). These tendencies to specialise and also to 
link TC with capital assistance appear generally sensible, 
with the proviso that there may always be a danger of 
nurturing a cosy and inbred expatriate enclave which may 
operate below its potential and be self-perpetuating. 
A full evaluation of UKTC for rural development would 
be a massive undertaking and would require a team with 
competence in several technical fields. What can be 
attempted here is a selective discussion. There is much 
technical assistance, such as that to the Veterinary 
Department, which is of critical importance to the Botswana 
economy. Training c£ agricultural and community development 
staff at the Botswana Agricultural College (6 UKTC persons) 
also has a key role. But to narrow the field the focus here 
will be on some initiatives
t
 in agriculture, which appear to be 
promising or successful in contributing directly towards social 
justice and more aid to the poorest. 
Such initiatives have to be seen against the background 
of rural poverty in Botswana. A recent Rural Income Distribution 
Survey found that 45 per cent of ruralhouseholds own no cattle 
at all. Thus programmes for cattle, though vital for the 
economy, do not bring direct benefits to those who are worse off. 
However, 7 out of 8 rural households have some agricultural land, 
and in any one year 6 out of 8 rural households will plough. 
Programmes for arable farming if carefully devised and implemented 
have some potential at least for benefitting many of those in the 
poorer target group. Many of these are women heads of households, 
and women play a preponderant part in cultivation, performing 
most of the work, with men normally responsible for ploughing. 
Programmes for small stock can also be expected to reach some of 
those without cattle. 
In the Ministry of Agriculture, some UKTC personnel are 
very actively engaged on work which seems likely to lead to 
improvements for some of those who are worse off. Some examples 
are: 
(i) one UKTC person engaged on smallstock development, 
forming, and working through, groups of owners. The 
main immediate measure is dosing to reduce the very high 
(said to be 50 per cent) mortality among young smallstock. 
While many smallstock owners also own cattle, they also 
include poorer people who do not. 
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one UKTC person engaged on the reorganisation of 
extension, devising and introducing management 
techniques which should make extension staff more 
productive and easier to detach from the larger, 
richer farmers and to link up with and assist those 
who are poorer. 
a three-team arable farming research project involving 
some 10 UKTC staff. The original project began in 1970. 
The three teams are now simultaneously and respectively 
engaged on research (the Dryland Farming Research Scheme) 
and evaluation of that research with farmers (the Eval-
uation of Farming Systems and Agricultural Implements 
Project and the Integrated Farming Pilot Project). The 
innovations being tested include a form of tillage which 
retains moisture in the soil more than traditional ploughing, 
row planting using a seeder with fertiliser placement for 
each seed, row weeding and the use of donkeys for draught. 
A toolbar - theMakgonatsotlhe - developed by the Brigades 
at Mochudi is being tested by farmers under field conditions 
with supervision by UKTC personnel. Potential benefits of 
this cultivation system and of the toolbar for poorer people, 
if the tests continue to show promise, include: 
- enabling more people to cultivate and to cultivate with 
less effort. The sweeping system of cultivation used 
with the Makgonatsotlhe requires less draught power 
than mouldboardploughing. Donkeys can be used instead 
of oxen, and cultivation can be carried out by women, 
very few of whom are strong enough for conventional 
ploughing. 
- bringing down the capital cost of draught power and 
thus enabling more people to become self-sufficient. 
The capital cost is dramatically reduced from about 
P1200 (for 8 oxen at PI50 each) to about P90 (for 6 
donkeys at PI5 each) 
- raising yields and reducing risks. Soil moisture is 
better retained and yields of sorghum and maize may on 
average be several times higher using the whole package 
(including" fertiliser) than with traditional ploughing. 
In sum this is a case where a major multi-disciplinary R and 
D input by UKTC, both developing its own innovations and 
adopting and further developing those of others, is working 
closely with farmers on a system which may well prove to be 
of considerable benefit to the majority of rural dwellers 
in Botswana, including many of those who are poorer. 
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(iv) one UKTC person engaged on the formation of women's 
groups, partly working with the Integrated Farming 
Pilot Project. Many women heads of households, often 
tfith their husbands absent in the mines, are responsible 
for agricultural operations, and constitute one of the 
most disadvantaged rural groups. 
(v) one UKTC person who coordinated the public consultation 
on the national policy on tribal grazing land. This 
consultation, probably the first of its kind anywhere 
in the world, involved the formation of village teams, the 
training of radio listening group leaders, the formation 
of some 3,000 listening groups with an average attendance 
of 17 persons, and the completion and return of forms 
giving opinions which were then analysed and questions 
which were in many cases replied to on the radio. While 
the effect of all this on the poorest remains to be seen, 
many have probably been alerted and nobilised more than 
they would have been, and the chances have probably been 
reduced that the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy will 
benefit only the rich to the detriment of the poor. 
5,7 It might be premature to cite these as successful contri-
butions of UKTC to a policy of social justice and more aid to 
the poorest, but they are promising and exciting enough for it to 
be useful to ask what they have in common. Two features stand 
out to varying degrees: first, exposure to and two-way communi-
cation with rural people; and second, a readiness to innovate. 
Given that agricultural and most other rural development programmes 
have in the past tended to favour those who are better off, it 
may well be that these two characteristics are important, if 
not vital, if agricultural programmes are to be bent towards and 
to benefit the poorer rural people. 
5 R 
Examining UKTC more generally, however, these two character-
istics are only partially found. In the first place, exposure 
to and two-way communication with rural people is rather rare and 
probably becoming rarer. There is a marked urban bias in UKTC 
for rural development. Amongst UK personnel in departments 
directly concerned with rural development (Table 5), the numbers 
^ o are urban-based and rural-based are: 
urban-based rural-based not total 
listed 
UKTC 120 14 2 136 
Volunteers 12 17 - 29 
L 
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There is probably a trend of shrink-back of UKTC from rural 
t 0
 urban areas. In the Ministry of Agriculture, for example, 
a
ll District Agricultural Officers, who used to be expatriates 
a r
e now Batswana, and only 3 out of the 5 Regional Agricultural 
Officers are still expatriates. It is the field posts which 
tend to be localised first while the urban headquarters in 
G a b o r o n e and Lobatse remain heavily expatriate. It is 
questionable how much direct exposure these expatriates have 
to rural realities and how much they really see and understand 
especially about the poorer people when they do make field 
v i s i t s . I t may be symptomatic that in the first 7 months of 
the current financial year, the Ministry of Agriculture is 
said to have spent only 29 per cent of its recurrent vote for 
transport. There may well be a tendency for a heavily expatriate 
urban-based ministry, in a country where rural travel is difficult 
and takes rather a long time, to be out of touch with its rural 
and especially poorer rural clients. 
9 Second, the extent to which UKTC personnel are open to new 
ideas and to learning,committed personally to social justice 
and more aid to the poorest, and as able and willing to innovate 
as is needed in order to reach and benefit the poorest, is, to 
say the least patchy. There are outstanding examples, including 
some of those cited. Many of the younger UKTC personnel combine 
energy, enthusiasm, and sensitive commitment in a way which 
enables them to understand, be accepted by, and help those who 
are more disadvantaged. But there are also some older people 
whose minds have set inappropriately but who know how to survive. 
In agriculture they are probably less common than they were,.and 
a second wave of UKTC has replaced some of them. But a problem 
still remains, especially when such people are involved in recruit 
ing further staff themselves. For they may then be more inclined 
to perpetuate their own sort than to select the type of person 
who is really needed. 
A further serious problem concerns management. Many of 
those UKTC personnel in senior posts in departments or ministries 
concerned with rural development have considerable practical-
experience. However, much of this has been in Africa where the 
earlier more or less automatic authority of the expatriate 
made management rather easy for them. Adaptation to the 
difficult tasks of training Batswana, of having counterparts and 
of working with other expatriate nationalities, demands a 
sensitivity not always fostered by the earlier experience. Few, 
if any, of the UKTC personnel have received professional manage-
ment training; yet had they been working, say, for a multi-
national corporation instead of for OSAS or SCAAP, management 
training would have been a regular part of their personal and 
career development. 
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Future UKTC must depend in part on the evolution of 
Botswana's polfcies and programmes for rural development. 
The Government may move towards programmes much more 
s p e c i f i c to t h e rural poor, and simultaneously there may b e 
a
 tendency to wish to contain, if not reduce, the heavy 
e x p a t r i a t e presence in urban areas. There may be an increased 
demand for people who will live, work and innovate in rural 
areas, together with a somewhat moderated demand for urban-based 
TC. This can only be speculation, but should this occur, it 
would be very much in line with"more aid for the poorest"for the 
UK to seize the opportunity presented. 
12 The conclusions towards which this discussion leads are 
that for the future; 
(i) selection of UKTC personnel for posts related to rural-
development should^&riented towards identifying and 
preferring people who are adaptable, predisposed or 
willing for direct rural contact, with appropriate 
attitudes towards Botswana and Batswana, and with a 
capacity to innovate. 
(ii) Care should be taken in selecting those who do the 
selection. 
(iii) The UK should examine the urban-rural locations of its 
staff and be ready to increase the rural proportion, 
especially through volunteers and younger people. 
(iv) Technical staff with OSAS-type careers should receive 
management training. 
(vi) As part of the orientation course specific to 
Botswana proposed below there should be a voluntary 
village live-in of between one and three weeks for UKTC 
personnel coming to Botswana to work on rural development. 
British Technical Cooperation in the Education Sector 
The circumstances described in section H I of this case study 
led the Botswana Government to give the development of education 
in Botswana very high priority. The expansion of the formal 
system has been extremely rapid. Over the first ten years of 
Independence, enrolments in primary education increased by over 
60 per cent and in secondary by more than 450 per cent, and the 
number of students enrolled for university degrees increased 
more than ten-fold over their 1966 levels. Programmes of 
technical, nursing, teacher and agricultural training are also 
very much larger today than they were in the mid-1960s. These 
rates of expansion have generated large increases in the demand 
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for teachers, particularly in the secondary schools, and it is 
in this area that most British and other technical cooperation in 
education has been and still is needed. 
TABLE 6 
Deployment of OSAS personnel in Education, as at September/ 
October 1976 
Ministry of Education 
Primary School Teachers/Principals 
(English Medium Schools) 16 
Secondary School Teachers/Principals 35 
Teacher Training College Lecturers/Principals 6 
Vocational Training Centre Lecturers 10 
Education Officers 3 
Director,Unified Teaching Service" 1 
Sub total 71 
Office of the President 
Botswana Training Centre Lecturers 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Botswana Agricultural College 
Lecturers/Instructors 
Grand Total 78 
It can be seen from Table 6 that over 65 per cent of British 
supplemented personnel in education are teachers in primary 
and secondary schools. Though the need for British teachers 
will continue, the structure of support is likely to change 
significantly over the next few years. 
With regard to primary education, OSAS personnel have 
traditionally taught in a small number of English-Medium 
primary Schools. These schools have presented a problem for 
the Botswana Government. Their costs are high, and the quality 
0
f teaching and availability of resources are of a considerably 
higher standard than most other primary schools. Their continued 
e x i s t e n c e - though in some ways anomalous and working against 
the principle of providing equal educational opportunities for 
a
ll - is nevertheless accepted by the Government as necessary 
for the purpose of providing high quality education for 
expatriate primary school-age children. However, these schools 
have been organised in a way which has subsidised mainly the 
richer members of the local and expatriate communities. British 
Government support in the past has been based upon the need to 
ensure adequate education for British children, since this is a 
crucial factor in recruitment. A recent change in the policy 
of the Botswana Government, however, will facilitate the phased 
withdrawal of OSAS support from these schools. 
6,3 At present the English-Medium Primary Schools are heavily 
subsidised by the Botswana Government. Recurrent costs per 
pupil are currently estimated at P370 p.a. compared with about 
P40 p.a. in Setswana-Medium Schools. The fees at the former 
schools have been P54 p.a., compared with P3 p.a. in the rest 
of the primary school system. The Government is committed to 
a policy of multi-racialism in education, and therefore has not 
excluded Batswana from the English-Medium schools. However the 
fees are in future to be raised to cover all costs, and the 
schools are to be transferred from Government to private 
management. Batswana children are expected to comprise about 
50 per cent of the total enrolment of these schools. Though 
these children will in general have much better chances of 
progressing to secondary school than other children^ owing to 
better teaching and resource standards, they will represent less 
than 3 per cent of the Form 1 intake each year, and the Government 
feels that the distortion created by the continued existence of 
these schools not be serious. Meanwhile, however, OSAS teachers 
will no longer be recruited, since present regulations preclude 
their employment outside the State sector. Though further 
technical cooperation may be possible under BESS arrangements, it 
is felt that the schools will be able to recruit teachers in 
adequate numbers from inside Botswana or abroad on a prisate 
contract basis. These changes should therefore release 16 OSAS 
posts (20 per cent of UKTC to Education) for re-allocation to 
other parts of the education sector, which we feel to be a 
welcome development. 
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The Botswana Government's policy on secondary education 
is summarised in the Fourth National Development Plan as follows: 
"Universality of post-primary edtication is not possible 
within the foreseeable future. It is in the national interest 
that post-primary education should be geared to the requirements 
of an expanding economyj Therefore... (its) provision is 
governed in large part by manpower needs. Although post-
primary education is to be exclusive the Government will 
ensure equality of opportunity through the fair distribution 
of facilities, the provision of bursaries and the use of an 
objective national selection system. Those individuals who are 
fortunate enough to receive post-primary education incur an 
obligation to the society that has educated them. This is 
given practical expression in the bonding system, which 
requires the recipients of state-subsidised training to serve 
the state for an intitial period after graduating." 
6,5 The rapid expansion of secondary schools in Botswana has 
to be seen in the context of the continued extreme dependence 
upon expatriate manpower, both in Government and in the private 
and^parastatal sectors. The expansion that has occurred and that 
is planned has been based upcn the target of localising almost 
all posts in all sectors of the economy by 1988-90, and the 
indications at present are that little or no secondary leaver 
unemployment will occur before that date. Certainly the current 
phase of secondary expansion (enrolments increasing by 28 per 
cent between 1976 and 1981) seems to be soundly justified on the 
basis of formal sector manpower needs. Even with rapid development 
of secondary teacher training facilities at the university, the 
expansion does imply, however, that the need for expatriate secondary 
school teachers will continue to be in excess of 300 persons until 
after 1980, many of whom will continue to be employed on a direct 
contract basis. 
k*
6
 In the context of these needs it can be seen that OSAS 
secondary teachers are only a small percentage of the total, and it 
can be argued that existing levels of support should be maintained, 
or even increased in the short term - or at least for as long as 
the Government's projections for localisation needs remain 
plausible. There are, however, some important problems that 
currently affect the quality of the contribution made by the OSAS 
programme in secondary education, and which, we believe, need 
urgent attention. 
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The first, and most pressing, of these concerns contract 
arrangements for OSAS teachers. These are at present exactly 
similar to OSAS personnel working in the central Government. 
This means that from any date after the 27th month of service, 
a teacher may give three months notice of his intention to go on 
overseas leave, irrespective of the timing of his departure 
date with regard to the academic calendar, and irrespective of 
whether he is terminating or renewing his contract. In practice 
this means that teachers may go on terminal leave in the middle 
if a school term - and many do this - and in cases where a 
teacher is renewing his contract, the length of leave accrued 
makes it impossible to integrate his departure and return dates 
with school vacations. This circumstance both places fceavy demands 
on other teachers whilst the officer is on overseas leave, and 
seriously disrupts the teaching of classes - often in the critical 
stage of preparation before examinations. We believe that this 
situation is a significant contributory factor to the current low 
educational standards in many of Botswana's secondary schools. 
We recognise that a change in existing contractual arrange-
ments is complex, in that it will also affect many countries 
other than Botswana. However, there are issues of principle that 
are common to all countries. Firstly, it seems inappropriate to 
argue that OSAS contracts have to be the same for both teachers 
and non-teachers, since the conditions of service are already 
substantially different with regard to local leave arrangements 
as between the two groups. Secondly, the required changes of 
a contractual nature can in most cases be minimal. From the 
perspective of Botswana the changes required are as follows: 
the majority of teachers ought to be hired as from the beginning 
of the school year (1 January). Contracts should run for 30 to 
36 months, as under the new contracts recently introduced. Teachers 
would accumulate leave in the normal way
s
 but would be required 
to take their statutory 10 days local .leave per year during the 
school vacations. Overseas leave would preferably be taken as from 
the end of the school year (December) but in all cases would have 
to coincide with a school vacation. In cases where a teacher 
renewed his contract he would be required to return to Botswana-
for the beginning of the term, and would receive pay in lieu of 
leave in cases where his leave entitlement was longer. The 
Christmas school vacation in Botswana for example would allow a 
teacher up to seven weeks' leave'in UK. These arrangements are 
felt to be a highly desirable innovation from the point of view of 
the Government. Also those OSAS teachers whom we interviewed all 
welcomed such a change. It would seem that the small change in 
contractual arrangements could be standardised for all countries 
recruiting OSAS teachers, though the timing of the start of 
contracts would vary between the different parts of the world. 
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We received reports, both from the Ministry of Education and 
^ from headmasters that British teachers tend to be reserved in mixing 
w
ith the local community, and that outside the school they mix 
mainly with other expatriates. OSAS teachers often tend to be 
•nine-to-fivers
8
 and are reluctant to take on voluntary extra-
c u r r i c u l a r duties. Here t h e r e seems to be a contrast with t h e 
v o l u n t e e r s , who though often less experienced and professionally 
c o m p e t e n t , take the community aspects of their work very seriously 
and are enthusiastic organisers of out-of-school games, clubs and 
other activities. 
6i
io
 I n
 spite of this, however, it is significant that both the 
Ministry and most headmasters prefer OSAS teachers to any other 
TC or volunteer personnel. They have a reputation for doing a 
very solid and professional teaching job in the context of the 
timetable, and have the advantage over other nationalities of 
themselves being products of an education system that is very 
similar to Botswana's. They understand the JC/COSC system, and 
the content of the school curriculum is familiar to them. Though 
this may beg the question of whether changes in curriculum content 
are needed for most Batswana, it is probably true that OSAS teachers 
are at present better prepared to teach in secondary schools than 
those expatriates supplied by other agencies. One disappointment, 
however, is that the IVS have recently suspended recruitment of 
secondary school teachers for Botswana, mainly on the grounds that 
the secondary schools are producing an elite, and have little or 
nothing to do with assisting rural development. We feel rather 
strongly that this policy is short-sighted. There is a pressing 
political and social need to replace middle and senior-level 
expatriates in all sectors of Botswana's economy which, given the 
existing institutional structure in education and the labour 
market, can only be done through the medium of secondary and post-
secondary education and training. Helping to raise the quality of 
these institutions - particularly in terms of extra-curricular 
activities - is an important task for the sustained growth of the 
modern sector and of government revenues. This will continue to 
be the main way of generating the resources needed for long-run 
rural development. Improving the quality of the secondary schools 
can therefore have important indirect benefits for the rural poor. 
The p o s i t i o n taken by IVS is also regrettable in that this agency has 
had the highest reputation among volunteer organisations supplying 
teachers, and had the additional advantage of familiarity with the 
syllabus and system as in the case of OSAS personnel. It is felt 
most desirable that this decision be reversed, since to force 
1
 Botswana to recruit from other sources - particularly from agencies 
supplying personnel for whom English is not the mother tongue - may 
be a strongly sub-optimal use of volunteer resources, and may have 
unfortunate consequences throughout the secondary and post-secondary 
education system. 
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Earlier comments on the OSAS programme in education are also 
generally applicable to OSAS teachers and lecturers in the other 
post-secondary institutions. Here the numbers are smaller, and 
there is less need to be as concerned with extra curricular 
activities as in the schools. In these education and training 
programmes, professionalism and competence are the most important 
qualities amongst the staff, and in general, the principals, and 
the Ministry of Education have been satisfied with the calibre 
of the staff they have received. With the exception of initiatives 
taken by the University, which has had BESS supplemented personnel 
for a number of years, UKTC officers have not been heavily 
involved in the important and pioneering non-formal education 
programmes developed in Botswana over the last ten years. The 
Brigades, for example, have largely had volunteer assistance, 
and have been well served with enthusiastic young people, on whom 
much of the early success of the movement depended. A future 
supply of such people will be needed for some time. It is 
probably best that supplemented personnel should not be 
involved in these and similar schemes, owing to the difficulty 
of identifying the right type of people in the context of a 
contract system. Where, however, cases arise of volunteers who 
have proved their value to Botswana needing to be retained, 
requests for transfer to supplemented arrangements should be treated 
with imagination and sympathy. Past experience demonstrates that 
the value to Botswana of being able to retain young people with 
good local experience can often be far greater than that of 
recruiting two or three new contract people from abroad. 
ODM has been notably involved in one educational project 
which may be able to affect significantly the quality of 
education given in Botswana's primary schools. The project is 
a major attempt at teacher up-grading and curriculum development 
that has used an imaginative approach to tackling the main 
problems in primary education. A team of 6 officers under SCAAP 
terms, together with a project leader, has for the past three 
years been conducting in-service training of teachers in the 
schools and in the TTC's, and has also helped with the pre-service 
training of primary school teachers. New teaching aids and books 
have been prepared, in both Setswana and English, and there is 
considerable enthusiasm, both amongst Ministry staff and the 
Principals of the Colleges for the progress that has been 
achieved. This is not the place to dwell on the detailed problems 
of the project, which are in the main connected with personnel 
difficulties arising from divided loyalties as between the TTCs 
and the project as a whole. Suffice it to say that these 
difficulties look as though they have now been solved, and with 
continued good leadership one may expect the second phase of the 
project to bring enhanced benefits for the primary schools over 
the next three years. 
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In summary, then, one can say that, though the main focus 
of UKTC in education has not been, nor is now explicitly 
directed at helping the least privileged members of the community, 
it has had important indirect benefits for such groups.Assistance 
to the English-Medium Primary Schools is a low priority, and 
hopefully will be phased out in the near future. OSAS personnel 
in the secondary and post-secondary system have a crucial part 
to play, both in helping the localisation of the formal sector, 
and at higher levels, in the training of Batswana teachers who 
are desperately needed in all branches of the system. In this 
sense, ODM's capital and personnel support for teacher education 
both in the TTCs, the University and the schools themselves is 
the right strategy. Notwithstanding this, Botswana will continue 
to depend upon OSAS teachers at secondary and higher levels for 
at least the next ten years. 
The Orientation of UKTC Personnel 
We have already discussed the importance for successful TC 
of personal relations with Batswana, of sensitive and supporting 
attitudes towards national objectives, and of extra-curricular 
activities in the case of TC for education. There are no simple 
or fully effective ways of tackling these issues, but we strongly 
reconmend one measure - a training course for newly arrived TC 
personnel and their spouses. We feel that an insufficient number 
of UKTC officers take the trouble to learn any Setswana, or to 
learn anything about local customs. Few of them know much about 
the development goals, of the country, or of its social and 
political history. 
An orientation course of one or two weeks would help to 
remedy this. It could include an address by a Minister on 
national goals and policies and a brief introduction to the main 
issues and policies in each sector. This wight be led by a planner 
from the Division of Economic Affairs and would draw on the 
current Development Plan as a source document. Each day could 
include language training to teach and practise the main Setswana 
greetings together with a small basic vocabulary. Lectures/films 
on Botswana could be arranged on development projects, and on the 
people and customs of the country. Rural visits perhaps including 
a large village, and a small village, and a cattle post, could 
be included. We envisage that the opportunity would be taken 
during this course to emphasize the training responsibilities 
of all TC officers - not merely to say that they are important, 
but to provide some help and guidance as to how they may be 
tackled by individuals. In this regard a role-playing exercise 
would be useful. This might set up typical office situations 
likely to confront a range of professional, administrative and 
technical personnel (for example, how to get the most out of a 
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counterpart relationship; how to relate to Batswana colleagues 
and subordinates; how to delegate, and to involve one's juniors 
in decision-making, etc). 
The organisation of the course would be crucial. Details 
should be worked on without delay. It might be possible to start 
with volunteer training as proposed currently by IVS and build 
on that. This initiative will provide a training and orientation 
course for all volunteer agencies in Botswana, which will include 
some of the elements of the proposal we have outlined. There are 
clear benefits of coordinating this inter-agency training, if 
only because of the shortage of good Setswana teachers in Gaborone. 
Some elements of the course we propose would be common as between 
the TC and volunteer personnel (particularly the language training), 
though other aspects should be organised separately. The long-
term aim would be a training centre for all arriving TC and 
volunteer personnel, financed on a per-capita fee-paying basis 
by each agency. The present initiative by IVS could be treated 
as a pilot project, over a period of six months with, perhaps, 
some newly arriving UKTC personnel participating on a voluntary 
and pilot basis. 
UKTC personnel are likely to continue arriving in Botswana 
at the rate of about 100 per year. During any one year, this 
might mean eight of the main courses each involving about twelve 
families. Effective training of the sort we have in mind would 
carry risks and doubtless involve some failures. It would be 
critical for the trainers to be sensitive, imaginative, courageous, 
and very familiar with the country. We believe that this innovation 
could do much to much reduce the more negative and undesirable 
effects of TC that we have been discussing in this report, and we 
found a wide measure of agreement with this view amongst the 
senior Batswana officers with whom we have discussed the proposal. 
As an adjunct to this course, an optional extra should be 
an opportunity for direct exposure to rural and village life. We 
have noted the pronounced urban bias of UKTC for rural development 
and we believe that many UKTC personnel whose work involves rural 
policies and programmes rarely have the opportunity to experience, 
observe, and understand at first hand the conditions and problems 
of rural life. We recommend that the minority of UKTC personnel 
who are directly concerned with rural policies and programmes 
should be permitted and encouraged to spend between one and three 
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weeks living in a village as part of their orientation. 
Experience with village live-ins already acquired by some of 
the volunteer agencies has both positive and negative lessons 
which should enable this proposal to be designed so that it is 
effective for the UKTC guest in the village and at the same time 
beneficial for the village hosts. An interpreter should be 
provided and some of the time taken up with a programme partially 
tailor-made for the needs and interests (health, agriculture, 
water etc) of the UKTC person. Each person might report at the 
end on some particular aspect of village life close to his or 
her professional interest. We believe that this simple measure, 
whilst not involving many UKTC officers, would have a consider-
able impact on the effectiveness of that UKTC which is directly 
concerned with rural development, besides providing personal 
experience of long-term value for other rurally-oriented work. 
EVALUATION OF BRITISH TECHNICAL COOPERATION 
MAURITIUS ; A CASE STUDY 
Jake Jacobs & Bernard Schaffer 
Institute of Development Studies 
at the University of Sussex 
"The true state of every nation is the state of common life" 
Dr. Samuel Johnson, Journey to 
the Western Islands of Scotland 
OBJECT 
I. The purpose of this assignment is to examine British 
Technical Cooperation (t/c) to the Government of Mauritius 
over the past three years*, to assess its outcome and to indicate 
possible ways in which it might be made more effective in the 
future. 
MODUS OPERANDI 
2. After the Ministry had prepared a three-year list of 
t/c assignments (52 in all) a smaller list of 21 assignments 
was agreed bearing in mind sectoral representation, type of 
t/c assignment and likely manageability during five man weeks. 
This is attached as Appendix A . 
3. In the event 22 t/c** assignments were examined in 
Mauritius. For 21 of these, extensive papers were studied 
in the UK including those related to the application for 
t/c, recruitment, interim and final reports. The pattern of 
interviews in Mauritius was as follows : as many as possible 
of the actors concerned in each t/c assignment were interviewed 
under four general headings. The actors included the t/c 
officer (TCO) himself if available, members of the institution 
in which he had been working, representatives of the 
responsible Ministry and/or Department, representatives of the 
target group of clientele, in or outside Government, likely 
to be affected by the t/c assignment, representatives of the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and the Aid 
Secretary in the British High Commission (BHC). 
4. Thanks to the extremely efficient manner in which the visit 
of the authors of this report was handled within the Government 
of Mauritius (GOM) by the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development who accepted responsibility for making all the 
appointments, it was possible for us to hold 9 8 interviews with 
138 interested persons. These included the ffteoGltliFters for Finance 
and Rodrigues, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the P.S. to the 
P.M.'s office, the Financial and Establishment Secretaries 
and the Director of Economic Planning. 
The original terms of reference required an assessment "over 
the last seven years" but after discussions between IDS and 
ODM this was reduced to three on the practical grounds that 
the Ministry would have been faced with an impossible task 
of retrieval and duplication of papers bearing in mind the 
time constraints. 
The 22nd was that of Mr. Walters who succeeded Mr. Craze 
(A2 on Appendix A) 19 74-19 76 as Income Tax Training 
Adviser. 
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5. The four general headings common to all interviews were 
as follows : 
A . A negative hypothesis; how different, if at all, 
would the situation now have been had the t/c 
assignment under discussion never taken place? 
B . To what extent did the interviewee consider that 
the terms of reference spelt out on the form requesting 
t/c had been carried out? 
C. To what extent did the outcome of the t/c 
assignment make an impact on the development of 
Mauritius? 
D. To what extent did the outcome of the t/c 
assignment make an impact on the most disadvantaged 
in Mauritius? 
6. For questions B-D interviewers were pressed to quantify 
their replies on a scale of 0 to 5. Their answers are tabulated 
at Appendix B. 
7. We emphasise that these gradings do not constitute a 
criticism of the performance of the TCOs concerned. They are a 
measurement of the outcomes of assignments. The gradings show 
some significant degree of consistency. There are important 
differences in the gradings of questions B and C and there 
are almost always very low grades for question D. Some of the 
grades illustrate the phasing of certain projects and delays 
or even failures to implement. All the gradings refer to the 
situation at the time the question was put. 
8. Additionally, appropriate persons were asked to throw light 
on : 
(a) the background and origins of all the t/c 
assignments examined; 
(b) the processing of the t/c applications in 
Mauritius and in the UK; 
(c) the recruitment processes; 
(d) the briefing arrangements; 
(e) the reception arrangements; 
(f) the honouring of Government of Mauritius 
(GOM) undertakings including the provision of 
counterparts, where appropriate; 
(g) monitoring the work of TCOs; 
(h) the production and distribution of reports; 
(i) the effectiveness of the TCO in counterpart 
training and generally in communication,; 
(j) the TCOs adaptability, inventiveness and 
readiness to innovate. 
These issues will be examined in more detail later in the 
report. At Appendix E will be found a short statement on each 
of the 22 t/c assignments examined. These seek to answer the 
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negative hypothesis question (5A above) and to draw lessons. 
9. Jacobs arrived in Mauritius on 14 January 1977 and 
left on 5 February. Schaffer arrived on 21 January and left 
on 4 February. 
10. We are mindful that 50% of our report is expected to 
relate to future policy and it is a matter of some regret to 
us that we were explicitly discouraged by ODM from visiting 
Rodrigues. The Secretary, Aid in the BHC was good enough to 
let us have a copy of the report of the ODM/GOM Mission which 
visited Rodrigues in November 19 76. Unfortunately it was 
by then too late to rearrange our programme. Our regret was 
compounded by the fact that the newly appointed Minister for 
Rodrigues, at whose initiative we met, urged us strongly to 
see the island. In our opinion the needs of Rodrigues 
afford HMG an unparalleled opportunity which should not be 
missed, to make an effective contribution to development on 
the island fully in accordance with the GOM's development 
plan and ODM's country programme paper (CPP) for a comparatively 
modest investment. Moreover, such a development would be "an 
appropriate means of implementing (ODM's) new poverty-focused 
objectives" (CPP 5.3 p.10). We discuss this below, in 
relation to the Rural Development Programme (RDP) and Development 
Works Corporation (DWC). 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
11. There are two elements of change which are now beginning 
to affect deeply the operation of the United Kingdom t/c 
programme in Mauritius. They must be expressed in any evaluation 
of past and present t/c policies and in the consideration of 
future t/c projects. 
12. The first is the nature of the development problems 
facing Mauritius itself. Mauritius is an island state which 
had until recently appeared to be well on the way towards 
solving its problems of emigration and employment. That is 
much less true at this moment. The second element is the 
organisation, role and premises of United Kingdom t/c 
programmes. The emphasis from the UK on poverty and distribution 
and on rural development presents several difficulties in 
Mauritius. In addition the significance of the United Kingdom 
role in t/c particularly in comparison with other bilateral 
donors has altered over the past two years (see Appendix D). 
13. As far as the first change is concerned, it is true that 
increases in Mauritius GNP have coincided with heavy reductions 
in unemployment and apparent successes in family planning and 
population policies. However, increases in gross domestic income 
meant much heavier reliance on sugar, from approximately 25% 
of GDI in 19 70 to 40% in 19 74. The reduction in birth rate and 
the reduced natural rate of increase in the population seemed 
to falter and then level out in the last two or three years. 
There was indeed a "remarkable" increase in birth rate in 
19 74. The apparent improvement in employment figures was partly 
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a result of heavy sporadic recruitment into a somewhat crude 
and makeshift DWC and its relief programmes. Similarly the 
reduction in the emigration of skilled manpower had been 
partly effected by expansion in the public service, and in 
particular by extremely large increases in public service and 
public sector salaries. Anti-inflationary measures have 
scarcely gone beyond rather simple schemes of subsidy, as for 
ration rice and flour. There are evidently considerable 
elements of instability in this overall situation. In general, 
growth up to 19 73-19 74 was checked in 19 75, ironically 
coinciding with the end of the first Four-Year Plan. 
14. As for the UK t/c programme, some of the elements of 
change are especially challenging. It is not clear that they 
have been adequately taken into account. We indicate some of 
them here (we shall also take up some of their particular 
applications below, for example in relation to the RDP and 
possibilities for Rodrigues). 
15. The present role of the public sector and public service 
salary policies are creating severe problems of budgetary 
deficit and inflation. That was not alleviated by the Sedgwick 
Reports on public service salaries. As it happens, however, 
the United Kingdom t/c programme in the recent past has in no 
sense at all challenged the premises of these policies, either 
about the size, shape and increase of public sector salaries, or 
through the DWC and relief works employment. In particular, 
to a considerable extent the UK TCOs themselves, ®*em to havre 
shared the belief that inflation, brain-drain, etc., must be met 
by the types of increases which have been and are being 
granted. These increases have been large, anti-egalitarian 
within the service, and certainly so between the public service 
and less advantaged parts of the Mauritian community. Furthermore, 
public service salaries have been a leading influence in the formal 
sector. There are, of course, important exceptions. It is 
surprising how relatively uncritical of this trend UK TCOs 
in practice have been. The Wilson assignment on manpower planning 
is a notable exception. The issue is of course discussed In the 
country paper, but this document is not usually seen by TCOs. 
16. The failure to achieve further reductions in population 
increase has been looked at briefly by the UK t/c programme, 
for example in Professor David Glass' mission. There seems to 
be an occasional assumption in the UK t/c programme that 
Mauritius is not apparently a sharply dualistic society. Yet 
it was clear that the recent failure in population programmes 
related in part to divisions within Mauritian society, 
including severe and sharp spatial inequalities. There seems 
to be uncertainty in the UK t/c programme whether or not 
Mauritius should be dealt with as a relatively uniform society, 
which is moving towards the middle income belt. This 
uncertainty is relevant to many sections of the UK t/c programme, 
like housing. 
17. Insofar as there are remaining pockets of poverty and severe 
inequality in Mauritius, their distribution is rather complex. 
They occur in urban as well as rural and coastal areas and within 
some rural strata and occupational and other defined groups, 
including the Diego Garcian; Rodrigues, for example, is as 
0
x as any society by any standards. 
At the same time there are some developments in the UK t/c 
.'^gramme which are highly promising. The outstanding case is 
!
er
tainly the contribution the UK t/c programme is making to the 
jgislation and now the implementation of a Mauritius Social 
•
e
curity programme. 
•j, The second change is the way in which the new focus which 
pH is attempting, and the organisation of the UK t/c programme, 
,
an
 meet some of these problems. In the past, for example, the 
Operating premise of the UK t/c programmes and policy for Mauritius 
j
3S
 been that the key problem of unemployment, including jobs for 
,j,e young and the skilled, would be solved predominantj^ through 
industrialisation. This could achieve full employment by the 
1980s. This approach too should dominate manpower planning and 
gaining and educational policy. It is not now clear how far 
3K policy itself has resolved this past preference for 
industrialisation with the new emphasis on rural development 
(see para. 26 below). For example, should UK help to concentrate 
jn provision of basic human needs in the poorest villages? 
10. In practice there have been changes in Mauritius education, 
especially the recent abolition of educational fees at all levels, 
or rather their payment by the Government of Mauritius. This is, 
for the present, reinforcing rather than redirecting the belief 
in formal secondary education, certification through public exam-
inations, etc. Is it right for a smaller UK t/c programme to 
continue to assist the university so much? Should it switch from 
assistance in industrial training also to a more rural focus? The 
UK t/c programme has made, for example, through the Wilson project, 
a most effective and influential contribution to Mauritius. 
Does that contribution need re-examination now in terms of the 
focus on rural development, which is so different from the whole 
point and stress of the type of manpower planning which has 
in fact been set up? Or, on the other hand, is the main 
point of the UK t/c programme to be implementation of the 
Nilson Report? It might in any case mean a re-examination of the 
contribution which the UK t/c programme is making at present to 
Mauritian education. 
21. We recognise that these problems have been discussed in 
the CPP. However, unless they are also resolved it is 
difficult for the country paper to have the influence on UK t/c 
Programme choices, briefing and implementation, that it should, 
t^ present it is our impression that it is only in those t/c 
Projects which fit very well, as in Social Security, that the 
New policy is taken into account. 
22. This is related to another aspect of change in the UK 
t/c programme which is also properly discussed in the CPP. The 
programme in Mauritius has already moved from its position 
being the dominant donor. Mauritius is in this respect one 
Sample of a larger number of places where the UK t/c programme 
longer dominates the bilateral t/c scene. This does not mean, 
tawever, that making optimal use of such programmes is any 
®
a
sier, nor, in the aggregate, less important for ODM. We give 
'igures below (Appendix C ) . The figures show the change and 
comparative position of the UK t/c programme. An aspect of 
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this changed situation is that it presumably becomes easier and 
worthwhile to achieve what we suggest elsewhere, viz. to ensure 
that each t/c project is selected in terms of an overall strategy, 
that supervision and contact in the field between the Development 
Division, the British High Commission and the projects is maintained 
and also that, where relevant, the TCOs are in communication with 
each other (see para 36). The relation between the UK t/c 
programme and other t/c programmes also becomes more important 
for the UK. This is discussed below. None of these possibilities 
seems to be fulfilled at present. We give examples below in some 
projects. The apparent lack of communication between the t/c 
projects in manpower planning and in management services and 
establishments policy is a striking case. 
23. There are two further difficulties which are evidently 
being met in the current UK t/c programme. The first is the 
degree to which the Government of Mauritius is itself aware of 
the UK's own concerns in its new aid policies. It is our 
impression that save where, as in Social Security, the Government 
of Mauritius and the counterpart are necessarily involved in a 
redistributive programme, few of the counterparts or official 
contacts have had any discussions about the new focus, nor have 
the UK, ODM, and the GOM discussed the implications. 
24. The second difficulty is the actual problems of implementing 
a poverty-focused programme, case by case. As one of our colleagues 
has recently said elsewhere, about a basic human needs strategy, 
"The debate ... remains largely rhetorical in the absence of 
concrete analyses and proposals about the institutional structures 
for securing access to basic needs by the population presently 
denied them." (Dr. G.B. Lamb, IDS, 14 January 1977). This is 
precisely relevant to several t/c projects in Mauritius which should 
be brought into the debate, and to some of the most important 
developments now being considered in the programme. 
25. We give examples of some of the problems which do arise, once 
it is decided to implement this new aid policy. 
(1) The Sugar Planters Mechanical Pool has been set up 
by legislation to assist the small planters. It is 
also in general terms a very good case of UK t/c. However, 
the programme is evidently not meeting the needs of the 
smallest nor many of the relatively small farmers. 
Certainly the allocation of its time is not dominated 
by their needs. In particular, those who were excluded 
(not merely the landless who are excluded perforce) in 
the past by size or type of landholding or by agricultural 
practice, remain so. To make the SPMP a more effective 
agency for the benefit of the smallest farmers, the following 
changes would be required : 
(a) Rebriefing the TCO. 
(b) Difficult institutional changes in the 
SPMP itself. 
(c) A monitoring and evaluation system. 
(d) Detailed technical and financial 
alterations. 
(e) Changing the legislation. 
(2) The Mauritius Housing Corporation is an extremely 
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well-known and successful example of UK t/c. It 
originated approximately a decade ago, as a result of 
a UK Report (Burgess), a loan from CDC and the 
appointment of the present General Manager. It is 
accepted as one of the best parastatal organisations in 
Mauritius. It is primarily a mortgage institution, with 
some land bank and now some construction functions. Its 
success in the past and its accumulated funds enable it 
to provide loans with a negligible margin for ongoing 
management expenses. It has had an indubitable effect 
on home ownership and attitudes in Mauritius as a whole. 
At the same time, figures show very clearly that the 
minimum income at which a borrower could service an 
MHC loan is at least twice the median Mauritian income. 
Furthermore it is the machinery for allocating, in effect, 
highly subsidised loans to developers to construct 
apartment blocks. Its gestures in the direction of low 
income loans have had a total negligible outcome. Currently 
there are alternative and serious Mauritius housing 
problems described to us by one senior official as 
"desperate". These include (a) the replacement of 
cyclone damage and (b) the provision of low income 
housing through the 19 80s. It might well be thought 
that by now a contribution from UK t/c to housing in 
Mauritius would lie in just these directions. That can 
scarcely occur however, without a solution to detailed 
problems of policy and organisation by, for example, 
the Ministries of Finance and of Housing, and the Central 
Housing Authority (the present low cost, low income, 
construction parastatal organisation). There is a 
significant and long-standing French presence in physical 
planning, in "Matim". The present successful UK t/c project 
is coming to an end. Can the UK t/c programme be switched 
to these new directions? 
(3) The major case of programmes specifically focused on 
rural poverty and development is the IBRD and SIDA 
involvement in the RDP. The United Kingdom association 
with this programme has only been via the DWC. Critical 
evaluations have been done by the East African Development 
Division (EADD) ("In November 19 73 the High Commissioner, 
on advice from EADD, approved ... £170,000 for equipment 
purchases by DWC.". An evaluation was done by E.A. Dixon 
of EADD, November 19 76). One choice for the UK, which 
we understand would be favoured by some, would be more 
involvement in the RDP, either via the DWC or in other 
ways. Such an involvement would present some disadvantages 
as the evaluations (supra) have indicated. Improvements 
in the DWC were in any case negated by rapid increases 
in numbers employed on relief works during the approach 
to the recent election. The RDP itself, while specifically 
aimed at matching the profile of poverty needs defined in 
villages, has its own difficult problems of poverty 
focused programmes, for example, the institutional hierarchy 
between the Village Development Officers, project management 
and the Ministry; the recruitment, location and role of 
Village Development Officers; the types of need met, and 
participation at the local level. On the other hand, as 
we indicate elsewhere, a highly appropriate involvement 
would be available in Rodrigues. This would mean a 
switch in Rodrigues from dependence on relief work to 
a return to agricultural production, especially in 
livestock. Current assistance to Rodrigues includes a 
WFP programme, 1972-1977, $908,000, for small farmer 
land development food programmes and participation in 
the WFP school meals programme for Mauritius as a whole. 
There are two preconditions for such a switch. One would 
be for the UK t/c programme to be prepared to make its rural 
development and poverty-focused projects concentrate on 
Rodrigues rather than spread through RDP and DWC as a 
whole. The second would be for local decisions, which 
would give access for small livestock producers on 
Rodrigues to abattoir, cold-store and improved handling 
facilities. Here again there are explicit institutional 
problems as between the interests of Rodrigues and 
those of the Mauritius mainland abattoir and meat 
authorities. 
SPECIFIC ISSUES AND PHASES 
26. We have sought to examine the origin of each of the t/c assign-
ments studied, bearing in mind the averred objects of the Development 
Plan and the CPP. Each project seems to have its own dynamic and 
is sustained by its own momentum. It is difficult to see how, if 
at all, each was measured against the criteria or Qesiderata laid 
down by those two documents. There is no evidence that the CPP or 
other relevant papers are brought to the attention of TCOs during 
their assignments. It is difficult to see evidence that the 
inadequate staff planning mentioned in the CPP (3.17, p.9) is 
assumed when terms of reference are prepared and TCOs briefed. It 
could be said that the CPP does not take a line that is easily 
followed with its formula (p.l) that t/c projects "are balanced 
between industrial and agricultural sectors". We take the 
opportunity of calling attention to the fact that the t/c application 
form (A.l) is quite outdated and needs to be redesigned. We note 
that the Secretary, Aid a year ago suggested that the form needed 
amendment. 
27. One theme that is encountered frequently in the notes on 
assignments (Appendix E.) is that of terms of reference. Sometimes 
problems occur simply because terms of reference have been badly 
or even wrongly drafted. On other occasions they are not re-examined 
when assignments have continued over long periods of time or during 
changed circumstances. When in some cases they have been changed 
during an assignment, an objective examination of the case -for, 
and implications of the change has not been made. Some consultants 
have been given terms of reference much too wide for their particular 
capacities. 
28. We have suggested in Appendix E.(v. Hine and Jacobs and 
Henderson, Hughes and Busby) that there may be justification for 
a routine examination of the terms of reference shortly after the 
arrival in post of the TCO or consultant. Secondly, improved structures 
of assignments as used in some cases (e.g. Appendix E. Bradbury) would 
help to avoid giving terms of reference which are too wide for any 
use in consultancy. Thirdly it would be helpful if GOM could be more 
involved in the selection by donors of private consultants. We 
understand that this arrangement is used by multilateral donors. 
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29. We have paid particular attention to the arrangements for 
briefing TCOs and supplemented personnel on appointment and on 
arrival in Mauritius. Some strong views on this issue were 
expressed during our meetings with more than two-thirds of all 
such persons (v. Appendix D) which suggest that the record is 
very patchy and at times most unsatisfactory. The publication 
"Living in Mauritius" is helpful on matters of general interest 
though not all the TCOs and supplemented personnel have seen 
a copy. It is for consideration whether more could be done both 
on appointment and on arrival to brief people on the professional 
aspects of their assignment. One senior person even suggested 
that it would pay ODM in the long run to arrange a brief 
pre-appointment visit to Mauritius. There is little doubt that 
in some cases this would be so (e.g. the Telecommunications 
Engineer who suffered from having to wait for equipment ordered 
before his arrival only to find on delivery that it was quite 
inappropriate for his needs. An advance visit would have permitted 
him to order appropriate equipment and supervise its despatch 
to Mauritius. Other -Similar examples were quoted by supplemented 
personnel at the University). The difficulty would be to 
identify these cases in advance. For the majority, such an 
arrangement would be wasteful. The point could be taken up in 
some cases in the overall structure of the project: this is 
discussed below. 
30. We do suggest that more imagination could be shown in the 
UK to make briefing more effective. A ritualistic visit to 
Farnham Castle is patently not enough. Something at a higher 
level of sophistication is called for. Some discussion is, 
we suggest, desirable on whether the role of the TCO is to 
act as an agent of change or of consensus (see para. 39). 
The Geographical Desk is not, apparently, as a rule involved 
in briefing. We question this. Greater co-ordination with 
the GOM might also make it possible more frequently for 
appropriate Mauritians visiting the UK on both official and 
non-official matters to become involved in this process. There 
are examples of this having happened. The Mauritius High 
Commission in London would have to be involved since it is the 
most likely source of information concerning Mauritian visitors 
to the UK. It might also be considered as a resource for 
interviewers. It may not welcome the suggestion but the GOM 
has an overriding interest in the recruitment of qualified 
and well briefed t/c personnel. 
31. Briefing is part of the recruitment process. There have been 
examples where it has been considered to be de trop because the 
person appointed has already had experience in Mauritius. In 
one case that previous experience outweighed the fact that the 
person concerned did not have the basic professional knowledge 
to carry out quite new duties. Opinion are mixed concerning 
the weighting that should be given to previous experience. It 
was even suggested that experience too far removed in time -
8-10 years was suggested - might be such a handicap as to exclude 
from consideration a person with such attributes on the grounds 
that local attitudes have changed so dramatically during the 
intervening years. (It might be argued on these grounds that 
one of the authors of this paper might have been deemed ineligible 
for this assignment). Our own view is that each case should be 
examined on its merits and no such rules of general application 
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made. Almost without exception those to whom we spoke in 
employing institutions stressed that the personal character 
of the TCO was what really counted as being of no less importance 
than his professional qualifications. Of course, by itself 
that view provides little help in selection or in briefing. 
Hence our specific emphasis on communication and training 
capacity. We could add as desirable attributes, an interest in 
adaptation, experiment and innovation. We take the opportunity 
of asking whether it is not time for ODM to have its 
own conditions of service for officers serving overseas. The 
application of Estacode - albeit with modifications - does not 
always make for easy working. 
32. Once the officer has arrived in Mauritius he should be 
considered responsible for ensuring his own briefing. In this 
he should be able to expect support from the BHC and his 
employing institution. It is to be deplored that whatever 
the justification - or its absence - so many of the persons 
concerned consider that ODM, the BHC and indeed the GOM as 
a whole are "not interested" in them or the work they are 
doing. These views were expressed particularly strongly by 
OSAS and BESS personnel. (We are aware that very few OSAS 
appointments remain but we note that BHC has been "warned 
off supplemented personnel" by ODM. The Secretary, Aid BHC 
agrees with us that this is both undesirable and inappropriate). 
33. It has been represented to us that a critical issue for 
technical co-operation concerns the satisfactory provision of a 
counterpart officer for TCOs. Because this is always likely 
to present the GOM with considerable problems it was even 
suggested by a very senior official in the Ministry,,of Economic 
Planning that t/c in the form of operational TCOs, many of 
whom require counterparts, should be phased out in favour of the 
consultancy type of t/c whereby a team of professional 
consultants visit Mauritius for a short period, submit a 
report and leave the GOM to implement it - or not - from its 
own resources. We have suggested that it might be helpful to 
build into the BHC/GOM memorandum of understanding conditions 
under which counterparts when agreed should be provided. This 
might strengthen the hand both of BHC and GOM's Ministry of 
Economic Planning. However, it is not true to say as stated 
in a letter from ODM to BHC that GOM has "resolved that in 
future all posts should be purely advisory". We understand 
that there have been previous discussions between GOM and 
UNDP on this matter. 
34. The senior official's suggestion does not commend itself 
to us. It does however suggest that every person appointed by 
HMG through ODM, IUC or whatever should have it made clear 
to him at the outset that his appointment will involve an 
element of training. Training is not an operation which only 
concerns t/c appointments if and when they have a counterpart 
official working with them. On the contrary, all t/c appointments 
have an opportunity to act as trainers in some capacity and they 
should use their imagination to identify and exploit those 
opportunities. The implementation will vary. University and 
Institute of Education appointments carry the role inherently. 
In some cases, the impact on the whole section or organisation 
could be considered. (The writers of this report have for 
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example gone out of their way to explain to the Ministry of 
Economic Planning official assigned to them, the reasons 
for their own modus operandi and have endeavoured to involve 
him in all the aspects of the mission). It follows then that 
more attention must be paid at the recruitment stage to the 
capacity of the applicant to play a training role. Perhaps 
some reference to this could be made in the redesigned 
A.1 (v. para. 26). 
35. The strictures on recruitment and briefing raise 
questions of monitoring the work of TCOs and supplemented 
personnel. We have no doubt that the very complainants 
referred to would be likely to double their objections were 
there to be excessive monitoring and time-consuming demands 
for over-frequent reporting. The comparison with UNDP is 
relevant yet all the parties concerned, ODM, BHC, GOM, 
employing institutions and TCOs have an interest that the 
progress with t/c assignments should be appropriately 
broadcast. We indicate below the relevance of this point 
in the reduced t/c programme which the UK now provides in 
Mauritius compared with the recent past (v. Appendix C). The 
CPP (p.22) states that it has been agreed that a mid-term 
review of each t/c assignment should be conducted by the BHC, 
the TCO and the GOM. This does not seem to be happening 
(v. also references in the Smee report, para. 16). Although 
the persons in GOM to whom we have spoken on this subject 
acknowledge that the GOM ought to show an interest in these 
matters, very little has been done vis-a-vis UK t/c. We have noted 
the Uhlig report and the exchange its author had with the 
Secretary, Aid BHC. In our view it will be necessary for the 
BHC to convince the GOM that their comments during assignments 
and on their termination could be of mutual benefit. We have 
noted that such information is provided by the GOM to the GOI 
in respect of the latter
1
s t/c programme though this is 
associated with visits from an Indian inspectorate (v. papa. 44 
below). The only knowledge we have of serious reporting by 
GOM to ODM on TCOs relates to annual reports on ODM forms 
on Corps of Specialist members. 
36. Another aspect of monitoring concerns the opportunities 
afforded TCOs and others to be made aware of each other's presence 
and work. Such knowledge can be of direct usefulness on occasion. 
The Secretary Aid BHC has recently instituted a series of monthly 
notices to serve this purpose. The first of a series of luncheons 
has also taken place. We are informed that supplemented personnel 
have not been invited to attend. We recommend that they should be. 
Perhaps of more importance is our view - articulately shared by 
all the TCOs and supplemented personnel with whom we have discussed 
the matter - that such luncheons are not as satisfactory a forum for 
a discussion on problems and issues as was believed to be the 
case. Neither are random meetings in sports and social clubs. 
The Secretary, Aid has indicated that his attempts to have 
individual sessions with officers proved to be impossible because 
of the demands this arrangement looked like making on his 
time. We are not suggesting an inflexible formula of meetings 
at fixed intervals. We are suggesting that the issue needs to 
be put to the TCOs and supplemented personnel and opportunities 
created for an exchange of ideas as required. Perhaps the 
easiest vehicle for such an approach might be an addendum to 
t
he next monthly list of personnel to be distributed by the 
C. There is one additional aspect to monitoring. BHC ought 
5
urely to monitor in general the response of the employing 
government - its response to previous t/c reports and in 
particular the honouring of its obligations to individual 
jCOs as well as under the memorandum of understanding. These 
proposals, if accepted, will create additional demands on Aid 
Sections in BHCs who will need to ensure that they allocate 
their time appropriately. 
; 
37. As we have indicated, the arrangements for monitoring 
TCOs and others is not entirely satisfactory. Some experts 
feel they are neglected to the extent that no-one is interested 
n their work (v. para 32), in other cases ODM and the BHC 
have inadequate information concerning work progress. Periodic 
progress reports appear to be made by some officers though there 
seems to be no uniform policy on this. As we have already 
indicated, the mid-term evaluation cannot yet be said to 
be operational. One reason for this is acknowledged to be the 
inability of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development 
to convince employing departments and Ministries that 
they ought to devote appropriate resources to this operation. 
There is also a suggestion that subject Ministries and indeed 
TCOs themselves may resent criticism. The value of the 
only meeting to this end which has so far occurred was largely 
discounted by the casual, almost flippant nature of the comments 
which it evoked. It might strengthen the hand of the Ministry 
of Economic Planning and Development if some reference to 
mid-term reviews were built into the memorandum of understanding. 
We have suggested that EADD might be able to play a role also. 
The opportunity is taken to revive a proposal made over a 
decade ago by one of the authors of this report. It was 
suggested to ODM that a very small inspectorate could play 
an effective role in monitoring the work of TCOs. It is 
not suggested that this inspectorate should have a professional 
capacity covering all aid sectors. Rather, would it be charged 
to carry out on a continuing scale the sort of work on which 
the present authors have been engaged in Mauritius . Alternatively 
there-could.be more ad hoc missions of the present type. It is 
pertinent to observe that the Government of India and 
Prance both maintain inspectorates for this purpose although 
their modes of operation differ from each other. 
38. There remains the question of ex-post evaluation of t/c 
assignments. The quality of the reports by the TCO to the 
employing institution or Ministry has varied enormously. This 
does not only reflect the varied nature of assignments - in 
particular whether they have been advisory or executive. For 
assignments of more than one year we suggest that the report 
- in draft if need be - be submitted one month before the 
termination of the assignment, to permit comments b y , or better, 
a dialogue between, interested parties. There appears to be a 
wide divergence of perception as to what is required in these 
reports. 
39. We have already referred to the alternative role of a TCO 
as an agent of change or consensus. In approaching his work or 
taking a report on his work a consultant ought to be aware that 
there are two extremes between which he may have options to work. 
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At one extreme he may come with pre-determined ideas and with a 
minimum of reference to local sources pronounce his advice and 
report accordingly. At the other extreme lies the method 
whereby he consults with as many interested persons as 
possible, seeking all the time to achieve a consensus which will 
at the end be reflected in his report. We suggest that it is 
this latter approach which is usually more likely to achieve 
desirable results. (As contrasting examples v. Appendix E. 
Benwell and IMR Limited). Additionally TCOs are asked to 
complete a pro forma for ODM. Not all do so. We should like 
to know more about how these forms are processed and where. 
Some of the longer reports would benefit greatly from an 
index and authors might be asked to bear this fact in mind. 
40. Those officials in GOM with whom we have discussed the 
matter, acknowledge that GOM has been able to do very little 
by way of evaluating t/c assignments. They recognise that it 
is in their own interests to do more to this end. It is to be 
hoped that donors and recipients will feel able to exchange 
and indeed participate in these exercises. 
41. The role of the ODM Development Division impinges on many 
of the above activities. At the moment of writing neither frf
1
"
1 
the authors has had an opportunity of discussions with EADD 
Nairobi and indeed it is significant that no suggestion came 
from ODM that this would be a sensible step to take. Yet 
we have in the event been made aware of the significant difference 
EADD makes. We have also been able to see, via BHC Secretary, Aid, 
some of the excellent evaluations and reports produced by EADD 
and its officers. One of use-proposes to visit EADD on his way 
home but meanwhile there are a number of matters which would 
appear to merit examination. Applications for t/c are, we 
are informed, copied by BHC to EADD but the latter is unlikely 
to comment "unless it is involved". We are not clear what are 
the criteria though we understand that it depends on capital 
aid being involved. Prima facie, EADD could play a useful 
role in a number of the processes enumerated above including 
monitoring and evaluation and even, possibly, recruitment. We 
found great ignorance in the Ministry of Economic Planning about 
the role and functions of EADD. 
42. EADD might also have a useful role in tne assessment of 
requests for the renewal of t/c assignments. It possesses the 
general advantage of absence from on-the-spot pressures and for 
that reason alone we suggest its involvement might be routinised 
(unless our proposals above for an inspectorate are acceptable). 
The GOM appears to have a very equivocal attitude to requests 
for renewal of the TCO assignments. On the one hand, it has been 
suggested that such applications constitute no more than an 
attempt to perpetuate the comfortable employment of disinterested 
officers.On the other hand the GOM will support applications 
for the renewal of a contract largely to defer once again 
the moment of truth when a Mauritian official must dispense 
with the comforting presence of an adviser. On this score there 
is a difference between the case of supplemented officers 
and that of TCOs. 
43. There is some evidence to suggest (v. Appendix E. 
Pattinson and Brown) that renewals or extensions of assignments 
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are agreed without sufficient thought and examination of the 
justification put forward. This has happened because the 
negotiation of the extension or renewal takes place much too 
late. Could the Aid Section in BHC not be more active in 
anticipating cases where difficulties or embarrassment 
seem likely? This should certainly be raised at least one 
month before termination as a rule. 
44. The role of other donors, the interrelationships of all 
donors and the relationship between GOM and other donors all 
have some bearing on the effectiveness of HMG's t/c policies 
in Mauritius. We were able to talk to the Aid Secretaries 
in the Indian HC, the French and US Embassies and the 
UNDP representative. We received the impression that despite 
interpersonal relationships of varying degrees of warmth, 
more could be done at an official level to keep each other 
informed - perhaps even to act in greater concert vis-a-vis 
the GOM. The goodwill appears to exist. Thus for example 
the Assistant Secretary Aid in the French Embassy provided 
us with records of French t/c in Mauritius, details of which were 
not available in the BHC. Likewise the Secretary, Aid BHC 
reported that other major aid donors would welcome the 
opportunity to meet jointly with the GOM when determining 
future programmes. The GOM believes that this is not in 
its interest although we suspect it may not be fully aware of 
donor attitudes to this question. The officials in the Ministry 
of Economic Planning received favourably our proposal that 
they might meet with donors to discuss the merits of such a 
new approach. It is clearly of some importance to encourage an 
exchange between donors. We can only ascribe to an unawareness 
of UK policy the statement of the Indian Aid Secretary that 
"... the UK is phasing out its aid to Mauritius". As he went 
on to say that this resulted in urgent requests being made to 
him by GOM for experts to replace retiring UK TCOs it will be 
seen that there would be advantages in maximising 
donor contacts. It is of course unlikely that all donors 
would respond positively to the creation of a mini DAC: there 
are obvious reasons why, say, EEC members might be happy to do 
so. 
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APPENDIX A 
SECTOR/NAME TITLE OF ASSIGNMENT PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT 
jr~ 
administrations Development 
planning 
&.E. Bishop 0 * M Adviser February 19 71 - February 1975 
0.D. Craze Income Tax Training Adviser April 1972 - April 1974 
j.G. Goldsmith Private Secretary to G/G April 1961 - April 1976 
L.F. Smale Financial Adviser to Ministry of 
Local Government 
October 1970 - December 1976 
D.F. Wilson Economic Planning Adviser June 1972 - June 19 74 
j. Hine a G. Jacobs (TRRL) Traffic Control Study November - December 1974 
R.V. R. Marsh (a) Training Adviser for 
Telecommunications; later changed 
to (b) Adviser on Floreal Exchange 
October 19 74 - November 1976 
H.J. Norman Engineering Adviser to the Central 
Water Authority (CWA) 
June 1972 - June 1974 
M. Shackmaster Financial Adviser to CWA September 1972 - September 1975 
Consultancies i 
Henderson, Hughes and Busby Transport Study 1975 - 1976 
Crown Agents Study of the Telecommunications 
Service 
1973 - 1974 
J.C. Brown Mauritian Housing Corporation 1968 - 1976 
i S _ 5 S E 3 l _ E ® 5 o u r c e s 
A. Pattinson Adviser to the General Manager 
of the Sugar Planters Mechanical 
Pool (SPMP) 
July 1975 - July 19 79 
Consultancies t 
» 
P.E. Consultants Limited Study of the SPMP 1973 
Industrial_Develogment • 
A.N. Giles Industrial Estates Coordinator August 1974 - August 19 75 
A.G. Grinwade Adviser on Leather and Hides 
Manufacturing Industries 
January - May 1973 
Consultancies : 
International Market 
Research Limited 
Tourism Study Stage III Earlier Stages 1971, Stage'III 19 74 
Professor D.W. Glass Demographic Study January - February 19 75 
Social Development and 
Health 
J.D. Benwell Probation Services Adviser April - August 1976 
W.J. Pape Youth Employment Adviser April 1972 - April 1975 
ft.L. Bradbury 
. . ..... .. 
Social Security Expert 1976 - 1978 
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FELLOWSHIPS AND S CH0LARS11 IPS OBTAINED EXPERTS SERVING IN MA 'JRIT-'i' 
(3 9 72 - 19 76) (1972 - 19 76) 
j Y / D o n o r 1972 1973 1974 19 75 19 76 1972 1973 1974 19 7f- 19 7i 
•alia 4 7 8 6 9 Australia 2 2 
. • • .. 3 6 3 3 5 P . R . China - - - 11 11 
- - - 1 1 Denmark 1 2 2 2 3 
]i>y 1 " 1 1 1 2 France 25 23 26 32 33 
Scholarships 10 12 13 20 20 
i ) India 13 20 31 39 <1 
Fellowships 12 12 15 17 19 
1 2 2 3 4 6 Italy - - 2 - -
3
rlands 2 4 6 ' 8 9 Taiwan - 7 7 - -
Fellowships 2 1 2 2 _ 
iealand ) - Pakistan - - - 1 1 
Scholarships — — 2 -
stan 2 2 2 2 2 U . K . 42 46 51 41 32 
S.R. 11 . 20 19 21 18 U.N.D.P. 47 9 16 15 3 
19 41 21 31 20* 
ice* * 22 24 23 19 20 
D.P. 1 8 12 33 10 
T A L 94 140 130 16 8 141 T 0 T A L 130 109 135 141 124 
* to date 
-** plus about 40 "bourses J. 
universitaires" each year 
SD COUNTRY TRAINING . . — . — v 
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation sent four Sri Lankan Fellows to Mauritius in 19 76 and 
t two to Singapore under the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation Scheme. 
>
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APPENDIX E 
ASSIGNMENT REPORTS 
Note : details of the persons interviewed about each 
assignment and their perceptions of the outcome are shown 
in the Table at Appendix B. 
Technical Co-operation Report W.J. Pape 
Youth Employment Adviser 
1972-1975 and 1977 
Mr. Pape's endeavours have resulted directly in the creation of 
a Youth Advisory Service which is held in high esteem by employers 
in the private sector. His counterpart, albeit belatedly 
appointed, successfully took over the service on Mr. Pape's 
departure. In many ways this assignment was a model of t/c 
but paradoxically the brief visit currently in progress may 
bring about a crisis in the Service's relations with the 
Ministry of Employment. If the Service is seen to be an 
employment agency; if it is considered - as seems possible -
that it will be judged by the Ministry on the number of 
placements effected, it is likely to become subject to the 
same pressures as the Employment service and in the process 
forfeit the confidence of private sector employers. 
Technical Co-operation Reports A. Pattinson 
Adviser to General Manager 
Sugar Planters Mechanical Pool 
19 75-19 79 
P.E. Consultants 
Sugar Planters Mechanical Pool Study 
1973 " 
In assessing the effects of these two assignments we have had 
the benefit of seeing a Development Division report of May 1976. 
As a result of the consultants' report capital aid made it 
possible to obtain the necessary machinery and equipment for 
a viable mechanical pool. The appointment of a qualified manager 
was a pre-condition but in the event Mr. Pattinson did not 
occupy this post despite his belief that it was as General 
Manager that he had been recruited. The result has not been 
entirely satisfactory in management terms and in our view it is 
a pity that the recent extension of Mr. Pattinson's contract was 
authorised in view of the fact that a substantive appointment 
of a General Manager had finally been made. Mr. Pattinson has 
undoubtedly made a major contribution to the operation of SPMP, 
but no-one seems to have asked whether the Pool is fulfilling 
the function for which it was designed, namely to supply 
mechanical cultivation to small planters. We received a number 
of definitions of "small planter" (up to 100 arpents in the view 
of the consultants) but it is apparent that the poorest planters 
derive little benefit. The Development Division report indeed 
makes no reference to them. 
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Technical Co-operation Reports M.J. Norman 
Engineering Adviser CWA 
1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 4 
M. Shackmaster 
Financial Adviser CWA 
1 9 7 2 - 1 9 75 
Both these assignments made an important contribution to the 
establishment of the Central Water Authority (CWA). 
Mr. Norman's contribution largely concerned fixing salary 
structures and preparing schemes of service. These exercises 
were satisfactorily achieved despite problems which arose 
from the decision made, after the application had been 
made for t/c, that the appointment would be that of adviser 
and not of Assistant General Manager as originally stated. 
The outcome of Mr. Shackmaster's assignment was less satisfactory 
because the vital issue of water tariffs became a political 
shuttlecock whose existence has had repercussions far beyond 
CWA. If the legislation governing the operations of CWA is 
overhauled it could be that there will be a delayed benefit 
from this assignment. 
Technical Co-operation Report L.F. Smale 
Financial Adviser to 
Ministry of Local Government 
1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 2 : 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 8 
It was not possible in the absence of Mr. Smale to get a 
clear picture of the nature of the first of his contracts. 
In particular whether or not it was intended to be a 
wholly University appointment. In any event he became 
extremely valuable to MLG and chaired a Financial Relations 
Commission. It seems generally agreed that he has acted 
more as an adviser on local government than on local government 
finance. This has had the approval of MLG which has benefited 
from Mr. Smale's computer courses for the operation of the 
computerisation of rates - one of his innovations. The 
Municipalities have been less' happy but the situation is a 
very complex one involving the appointment of a Commission to 
replace elected councils. For the next two years it is 
anticipated that Mr. Smale will be working on the computerisation 
of salaries. The papers available from ODM do not discuss 
whether this change of function has been considered by them in 
agreeing to the extension. 
Technical Co-operation Reports R.V. Marsh 
Training Adviser Telecommunications 
1 9 7 4 
Floreal Exchange Adviser 
1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 6 
Crown Agents 
Study of Telecommunications 
1 9 7 3 - 1 9 7 4 " 
It would appear that something went wrong with the recruitment 
processes for Mr. Marsh : perhaps the selection body paid too 
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much attention to his former service in Mauritius and too little 
to matching that service with the job description. It became 
clear soon after arrival that he could not fulfil the duties 
of Training Officer. The Ministry of Communication responded 
by asking for Marsh's terms of reference to be amended. 
Although it took ten weeks for this approval to come through 
the outcome undoubtedly resulted in a successful contribution 
to technical co-operation and the completion of the Floreal 
Exchange expedited. It will cast a light on the Government 
of Mauritius filing and retrieval systems to mention that no-one 
we interviewed in either the Ministry or in the Department of 
Communications (v. Appendix B) was aware that a further t/c 
application for a Training Officer had been submitted. It also 
needs to be said that although the inauguration of the Floreal 
Exchange completed the island's automatic telephone network, 
the service is still suffering severely from what is euphemistically 
described as teething troubles. 
In the event the efficiency of the telephone service may depend 
on the decision whether or not to convert it into a parastatal 
organisation (as the CWA and CEB) . The terms of reference of 
the Crown Agents team made no reference to this point though it 
is one on which strong conflicting views exist within GOM. 
Technical Co-operation Report E.G. Goldsmith 
Private Secretary to the Governor 
General 
1 9 6 1 - 1 9 7 7 
This assignment is sui generis. Whatever the justification for 
this appointment whether within OSAS or key cadre it is now quite 
indefensible as a call on technical co-operation funds. Plenty 
of qualified Mauritians are available to fill the post. If 
GOM finds it politically inexpedient to appoint a Mauritian they 
should contract with Mr. Goldsmith direct. There are precedents. 
There must be a limit set to t/c appointments no matter how 
effective and acceptable the officer concerned (as in this 
case) . 
Technical Co-operation Report A.G. Grimwade 
Adviser on Leather and Hides 
Industries 
1 9 7 3 
This was not a well-prepared assignment. It is difficult to 
imagine how it was expected that in four months a newly-appointed 
adviser could be expected, inter alia to "organise producers in 
an association to buy raw materials and export products". In 
the event his recommendations did have some effect on the 
leather industry - notably on the introduction of machinery - but 
none on the footwear industry. However, we learned with interest 
that two Indian Government advisers on the creation of small 
industries who are working in the Ministry of Commerce have 
recently called for Mr. Grimwade's report which may thus, in the 
long run, have a somewhat greater impact on the leather industries 
than hitherto appeared likely. Furthermore, other proposals 
are now under consideration in the GOM whereby it may be possible 
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to effect a very considerable increase in the cattle population 
of Mauritius. Were these proposals to be implemented, Mr. Grimwade's 
assignment might assume greater significance. 
Technical Co-operation Report A.N. Giles 
Industrial Estates Coordinator 
1974-1975 
This assignment was instrumental in permitting GOM to maximise 
the opportunities presented by the establishment of the EPZ. 
The queue of would-be investors at the time of his appointment 
was showing signs of considerable frustration owing to GOM's 
inability to service them promptly. Significant job creation 
was thus made possible. However, no decision has yet been 
taken on the establishment of an autonomous parastatal agency. 
It has been argued that Mr. Giles
1
 success has been a major 
factor in making it possible to postpone the decision on the 
creation of a parastatal body. A very successful short term 
operational assignment. 
Technical Co-operation Report E.D. Craze 
Income Tax Training Adviser 
1972-1974 
This appointment was an outcome of still earlier assignments 
dating back to 1968/69. It was an unfortunate accident of timing 
(though one asks oneself whether it could not have been foreseen) 
that the main achievement of this assignment was to produce a 
training manual which became, in the words of Craze's successor, 
"virtually obsolete overnight" as a result of a change in legislation 
coinciding with the publication of the manual. However, there 
is little doubt that in the event the task of his successor 
was made easier by his work on the manual and the training 
programme undoubtedly benefited from his presence. 
Technical Co-operation Report Walters 
Income Tax Training Adviser 
1974-1976 
When GOM applied for a renewal of Craze's appointment in mid-
1973 it was not known that the IT legislation was due to be 
repealed and there was some debate as to the need for a further 
two years. In the event, Walters was able to revise Craze's 
manual and his assignment was extended by six months to enable 
him to complete the first one-year course. His counterpart is 
now running the second course, to the satisfaction of his 
Commissioner. This fact is seen as complete vindication of 
the success of Walters" appointment. 
Both these assignments have special significance for Mauritius 
insofar as they relate to more effective revenue administration. 
Technical Co-operation Report D.L. Bradbury 
Social Security Expert 
1976-1978 
This officer has only been in post for two months so it is 
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clearly inappropriate to think in terms of evaluation. However, 
there are certain aspects to the appointment and its background 
which merit some comment and may indeed indicate the 
ingredients of one successful model for t/c assignments. The 
current project follows an ILO report submitted and rejected in 
19 72 and a visit, not sponsored by t/c, of Professor Abel-Smith 
and Mr. Lynes of the British Department of Health and Social 
Security. The resulting pension scheme has been accepted by 
GOM and Mr. Bradbury's appointment is designed to implement 
it. Appropriate new legislation has been prepared. 
The nature of the project unquestionably satisfies ODM's new 
aid criteria. However, it is the way this particular t/c 
contribution has been structured that calls for notice. First, 
there was great concern shown at the highest political level 
which permitted an exchange at that level between t/c donor and 
recipient. Secondly, consultants of international repute 
were engaged outside t/c. Thirdly, the GOM deemed it worthwhile 
to send at its own expense a senior official for discussions 
with a donor institution and to meet the long term expert 
recruited under t/c in consultation with the consultants. 
Fourthly, arrangements were made for an additional consultant 
to be appointed after consultation with the first consultants. 
Fifthly, the consultant appointed under the fourth point above 
was able to make periodic visits to Mauritius and supervise 
the work of the long-term TCO. This mix seems likely to be 
extremely effective. 
Technical Co-operation Report A.E. Bishop 
Organisation and Methods 
1971-1975 
The project was rated well. In our opinion this is justified as 
far as Mr. Bishop's effort, energy and commitment are concerned. 
However, during the long course of the project, other events, 
especially concerned with pay, led to a staff demand for a 
reorganisation in establishments work. The proper response 
was a matter of dispute in the GOM. Mr. Bishop from then on 
became deeply involved in the outcome : an Establishments Cadre. 
This is a matter very different from his original terms of 
reference. Alternative UK advice might have been preferable 
at that moment. 
Secondly, while Mr. Bishop was very fortunate in his counterpart, 
Mr. Labour, now head of the Management Services Unit,(in the 
event the counterpart is now absent sick);the MSU is heavily 
under its establishment of seven; the MSU might well disappear 
into a Pay Research Unit, again a totally different device; 
Establishments Cadre itself is also under-established: for 
example, of 17 Senior Establishment Officers, there are 10 vacancies. 
The general lesson is that when TCO's terms of reference or job 
is subject to alteration, the basic expertise of the officer 
should be used as a constraint in deciding whether the change is 
proper. 
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Technical Co-operation Report D.F. Wilson 
Manpower Planning Adviser 
1972-1974 
This was an excellent, influential and appropriate project. Its 
effects continue, both in ODM and in Mauritius. The counterpart 
has been deeply affected by the project and is highly committed, 
as is the whole of the relatively stable Manpower Planning Unit 
which now exists in the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development. 
However, it was unfortunate that the project was not able to have 
had a more adequate effect on the development of public sector 
salary policy in its time. We were struck by how little was 
known of the Wilson Report itself, and indeed the project as 
a whole, for example in the Establishments Departments or 
vice versa. Implementation of key recommendations of the Report 
in training policy, and especially training organisation, is 
still hanging fire. The precise position is complicated (see 
GOM 1975-1980 5-year plan, Chapter 9, para. 9.9) . The relations 
with the Institute of Education and the Ministry of Education 
are not close. Further, other developments like the abolition 
of fees in formal certificated secondary education produce 
perturbations for the Wilson plan projections ore that type of 
policy. Greater co-operation between TCOs (in this case Wilson 
and Bishop) would have been welcome, for example about training 
organisation and public sector establishments policy. Implementation 
seems also to require constant effort, attention and revision of 
original policy and technical premises. Compartmentalisation 
of inputs from t/c, perhaps especially with manpower planning, is 
understandable and difficult to avoid, but always costly. 
Technical Co-operation Report J.C. Brown 
Mauritian House Corporation 
196 8-19 77 
This is an extreme example of the supplemented officer employed 
over a very long run and extended often at the last moment. 
It is also an example of a successful project, both in the 
organisation created and in the counterpart. A good man was 
available and the TCO took progressive initiatives to clear 
his way. More and earlier overseas training could have been 
used. The urgent present problem is discussed in the main report. 
The present housing problems have been described as "desperate". 
The good will for continued UK t/c is available and with this 
officer in particular. He should now hand over to his 
counterpart. It would be inadvisable to continue him with the 
Mauritius Housing Corporation itself therefore. An alternative 
role can scarcely be worked out in the time available, pending 
decisions by the Mauritian Government on policy and organisation. 
It is also to be questioned whether this TCO himself would be 
the most appropriate man for the type of programme UK ODM should 
now support. 
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Technical Co-operation Reports Hine and Jacobs 
Traffic Control Study 
1974 
Henderson Hughes and Busby 
Transport Study 
1975-1976 
It cannot be said that the daunting problems of Traffic and 
Public Transport in Mauritius which were the subject of these 
two studies have been much abated as a result of their 
having taken place. Some tough political decisions remain 
to be taken - in particular on whether or not to nationalise 
public bus services, a step which the bus owners are doing 
all they can to bring about. One positive outcome has been the 
creation of a Transport Unit under the direction of a TCO 
(Stewart) which is collecting traffic data, examining the 
control of public transport including routing and making a 
study of traffic management in Port Louis. On the last activity 
the Unit cannot take action until it has seen the report of 
a conglomerate of French consultants (Matim appointed under 
French t/c auspices). There has been some suggestion from 
GOM that it would have liked to have been consulted over the 
choice of consultants for the Transport Study and would have 
welcomed the opportunity to have refined their terms of 
reference after their arrival in consultation with them. It 
is claimed that this is a practice which French t/c authorities 
encourage. So far it would be difficult to argue that the 
studies have done much more than throw further light on the 
problems. It is to be hoped that they have a long-run 
potential for contributing to the identification of solutions. 
Technical Co-operation Report International Market Research Ltd 
Phase 1 - 1971 
Phase 2 - 1974 
Phase 3 - 19 76 
The tourist industry was given considerable emphasis in the 
Four-Year Development Plan and has had much impact, for 
example a four-fold increase in visitor arrivals over seven 
years; visible gross earnings from tourism increasing: 
1967 - Rupees 18M, 19 75 - Rupees 120M. 
However, the earlier developments were dominated by a single 
hotel group and their own private efforts. There was some 
thought that this was inappropriate in a variety of ways. 
Hence the Government of Mauritius, prompted by the Mauritius 
Government Tourist Organisation, the Ministry of Jouriam and 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, asked for 
UK help in a variety of questions. The whole job was given 
to a single private marketing research organisation who 
conducted their work in three phases. While the first two 
phases met some local opposition by affected interests, they 
also had a definite impact, for example on leases and land 
use policy. The third phase met much greater opposition, 
not only because it implied a much larger Mauritius Government 
Tourist Organisation and a marketing effort in South Africa. 
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An unfortunate error in forecasting, though honestly adjusted, 
helped the opponents of IMR. Hence the chances of implementation 
are now low. To date no action has been taken outside the 
MGTO. The Ministry of Economic Planning and Development is 
currently considering the Report, but at a junior level. 
There are several implications. In the selection of 
consultancy firms in such complex, delicate and wide-ranging 
issues, perhaps bilateral donors should involve the Government 
of Mauritius as multilateral donors and others do. Secondly, 
a single firm was asked to look at highly varied questions, 
like multiplier effects and research and evaluation, as well 
as marketing, land policy and organisation. Some longer 
local presence might have increased understanding and so the 
chances of implementation. The fourth question is the validity 
of reports which do not present an achieved local consensus 
(compare the Glass and Benwell cases). 
Technical Co-operation Report D.W. Glass 
Demographic Study 
January-February 1975 
This was a short but influential visit by a highly distinguished 
consultant. Apparently it coincided with a related visit by 
Mrs. Glass about which we have not been able to see any papers, 
despite considerable efforts. Clearly the visit by David Glass 
had a good effect on morale in the Family Planning and Mother 
and Child Health programmes and organisations. His report was 
also of use to the GOM in its approaches to' other agencies, like 
UNICEF, for a mobile clinic. Some of his specific recommendations 
have not and could only with great difficulty have been 
implemented. Nevertheless, the suggestions, for example about 
village dhai involvement, recording of all religious marriages 
and amending the legislation about abortion and sterilisation, 
might be said to have a helpful effect in discussion. However, 
the accuracy of the sociological data assumed by some of these 
points, e.g. about the continued significance in village life 
of the dhai, is probably open to doubt. This is presumably 
a limitation to be borne in mind about short-term consultancies 
with very wide references. 
Technical Co-operation Report J.D. Benwell 
Probation Services Adviser 
19 76 
This was an excellent and potentially successful project. Its 
structure has some slightly unusual and, again, potentially 
useful features. The approach to report writing itself, 
by the adviser, was also exemplary. The origin of the project 
was an understanding in the most concerned parts of the 
GOM itself about existing limitations in probation, aftercare 
and associated services and a desire to learn from the UK 
experience. There was no similar local agreement about what 
should happen in these areas. Hence the project was initiated 
in part to arbitrate between the disagreements. 
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The TCO was able to see papers before he arrived, as a result 
of ODM initiatives. He went out of his way to understand the 
local situation and to discuss and get agreement with the most 
relevant officials in the Government of Mauritius to anything 
which he put into his report. The report itself was direct, 
practical and detailed in its recommendations. The Officer 
also specifically recommended that there should be a return 
visit, in effect to help to introduce and implement this 
scheme when the report was agreed, and in particular to assist 
in training. This seemed to be a wholly admirable notion. 
However, either despite or because of changes in the GOM, with 
the Ministry of Reform Institutions for example, the report is 
not yet accepted or being implemented. There are a few 
disagreements at the most concerned official level, as 
was to be expected. It is true that the report would make 
significant changes in work carried out, especially for 
aftercare for ex-prisoners. It could be implemented 
nevertheless in a single major phase. There is a real risk 
that it will not now be implemented at all. In the absence of 
a TCO, there has to be care lest such a promising project does not 
wither on the vine. 
BLJ/BBS/JAL 
